<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/Documentation/admin-guide, branch v5.4.26</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>dm: add dm-clone to the documentation index</title>
<updated>2020-01-17T18:48:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Diego Calleja</name>
<email>diegocg@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-26T12:00:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2ed4cb6457ad13e5fb03323ee36e7dabb42f0475'/>
<id>2ed4cb6457ad13e5fb03323ee36e7dabb42f0475</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 484e0d2b11e1fdd0d17702b282eb2ed56148385f upstream.

Fixes: 7431b7835f554 ("dm: add clone target")
Signed-off-by: Diego Calleja &lt;diegocg@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis &lt;ntsironis@arrikto.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 484e0d2b11e1fdd0d17702b282eb2ed56148385f upstream.

Fixes: 7431b7835f554 ("dm: add clone target")
Signed-off-by: Diego Calleja &lt;diegocg@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis &lt;ntsironis@arrikto.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ACPI: sysfs: Change ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX to 0x100</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T09:20:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yunfeng Ye</name>
<email>yeyunfeng@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-14T07:16:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=58501792851d3c1ed64a8df98933ebf233b2e2bf'/>
<id>58501792851d3c1ed64a8df98933ebf233b2e2bf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a7583e72a5f22470d3e6fd3b6ba912892242339f upstream.

The commit 0f27cff8597d ("ACPI: sysfs: Make ACPI GPE mask kernel
parameter cover all GPEs") says:
  "Use a bitmap of size 0xFF instead of a u64 for the GPE mask so 256
   GPEs can be masked"

But the masking of GPE 0xFF it not supported and the check condition
"gpe &gt; ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX" is not valid because the type of gpe is
u8.

So modify the macro ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX to 0x100, and drop the "gpe &gt;
ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX" check. In addition, update the docs "Format" for
acpi_mask_gpe parameter.

Fixes: 0f27cff8597d ("ACPI: sysfs: Make ACPI GPE mask kernel parameter cover all GPEs")
Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye &lt;yeyunfeng@huawei.com&gt;
[ rjw: Use u16 as gpe data type in acpi_gpe_apply_masked_gpes() ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a7583e72a5f22470d3e6fd3b6ba912892242339f upstream.

The commit 0f27cff8597d ("ACPI: sysfs: Make ACPI GPE mask kernel
parameter cover all GPEs") says:
  "Use a bitmap of size 0xFF instead of a u64 for the GPE mask so 256
   GPEs can be masked"

But the masking of GPE 0xFF it not supported and the check condition
"gpe &gt; ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX" is not valid because the type of gpe is
u8.

So modify the macro ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX to 0x100, and drop the "gpe &gt;
ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX" check. In addition, update the docs "Format" for
acpi_mask_gpe parameter.

Fixes: 0f27cff8597d ("ACPI: sysfs: Make ACPI GPE mask kernel parameter cover all GPEs")
Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye &lt;yeyunfeng@huawei.com&gt;
[ rjw: Use u16 as gpe data type in acpi_gpe_apply_masked_gpes() ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>USB: documentation: flags on usb-storage versus UAS</title>
<updated>2019-12-17T18:55:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Neukum</name>
<email>oneukum@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-14T11:27:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d8fc2266c40fef226f3f0f6e5d839a75e2748c98'/>
<id>d8fc2266c40fef226f3f0f6e5d839a75e2748c98</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65cc8bf99349f651a0a2cee69333525fe581f306 upstream.

Document which flags work storage, UAS or both

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum &lt;oneukum@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191114112758.32747-4-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 65cc8bf99349f651a0a2cee69333525fe581f306 upstream.

Document which flags work storage, UAS or both

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum &lt;oneukum@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191114112758.32747-4-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status</title>
<updated>2019-11-29T09:09:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-15T16:14:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=75cad94d032b9ef500bc12004a3c695a9e85c729'/>
<id>75cad94d032b9ef500bc12004a3c695a9e85c729</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 64870ed1b12e235cfca3f6c6da75b542c973ff78 upstream.

For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.

For example, with only the "mds=off" option:

  vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
  vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable

The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.

Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.

Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.

 [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]

Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: x86-ml &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 64870ed1b12e235cfca3f6c6da75b542c973ff78 upstream.

For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.

For example, with only the "mds=off" option:

  vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
  vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable

The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.

Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.

Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.

 [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]

Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: x86-ml &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation</title>
<updated>2019-11-04T19:26:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gomez Iglesias, Antonio</name>
<email>antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T19:26:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7f00cc8d4a51074eb0ad4c3f16c15757b1ddfb7d'/>
<id>7f00cc8d4a51074eb0ad4c3f16c15757b1ddfb7d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the initial ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation.

[ tglx: Add it to the index so it gets actually built. ]

Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias &lt;antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nelson D'Souza &lt;nelson.dsouza@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the initial ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation.

[ tglx: Add it to the index so it gets actually built. ]

Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias &lt;antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nelson D'Souza &lt;nelson.dsouza@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: x86: mmu: Recovery of shattered NX large pages</title>
<updated>2019-11-04T19:26:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junaid Shahid</name>
<email>junaids@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T19:26:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1aa9b9572b10529c2e64e2b8f44025d86e124308'/>
<id>1aa9b9572b10529c2e64e2b8f44025d86e124308</id>
<content type='text'>
The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution.  This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.

By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution.  This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.

By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation</title>
<updated>2019-11-04T11:22:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T11:22:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b8e8c8303ff28c61046a4d0f6ea99aea609a7dc0'/>
<id>b8e8c8303ff28c61046a4d0f6ea99aea609a7dc0</id>
<content type='text'>
With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.

Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.

Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.

This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen.  With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.

[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]

Originally-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.

Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.

Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.

This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen.  With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.

[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]

Originally-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort</title>
<updated>2019-10-28T07:37:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T10:32:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a7a248c593e4fd7a67c50b5f5318fe42a0db335e'/>
<id>a7a248c593e4fd7a67c50b5f5318fe42a0db335e</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of
the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation,
guidance for system administrators.

 [ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ]

Co-developed-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias &lt;antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias &lt;antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of
the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation,
guidance for system administrators.

 [ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ]

Co-developed-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias &lt;antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias &lt;antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter</title>
<updated>2019-10-28T07:37:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T10:28:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7531a3596e3272d1f6841e0d601a614555dc6b65'/>
<id>7531a3596e3272d1f6841e0d601a614555dc6b65</id>
<content type='text'>
Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature
enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto
disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX.

More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html

 [ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature
enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto
disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX.

More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html

 [ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default</title>
<updated>2019-10-28T07:36:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T09:01:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=95c5824f75f3ba4c9e8e5a4b1a623c95390ac266'/>
<id>95c5824f75f3ba4c9e8e5a4b1a623c95390ac266</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.

Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.

 [ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
       - Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
       - Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.

Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.

 [ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
       - Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
       - Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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