<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/Documentation/admin-guide, branch v5.4.166</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xen/balloon: add late_initcall_sync() for initial ballooning done</title>
<updated>2021-11-17T08:48:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-02T09:19:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3d995568c9bb4082ed70fc6d205554fbb25c7f76'/>
<id>3d995568c9bb4082ed70fc6d205554fbb25c7f76</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 40fdea0284bb20814399da0484a658a96c735d90 upstream.

When running as PVH or HVM guest with actual memory &lt; max memory the
hypervisor is using "populate on demand" in order to allow the guest
to balloon down from its maximum memory size. For this to work
correctly the guest must not touch more memory pages than its target
memory size as otherwise the PoD cache will be exhausted and the guest
is crashed as a result of that.

In extreme cases ballooning down might not be finished today before
the init process is started, which can consume lots of memory.

In order to avoid random boot crashes in such cases, add a late init
call to wait for ballooning down having finished for PVH/HVM guests.

Warn on console if initial ballooning fails, panic() after stalling
for more than 3 minutes per default. Add a module parameter for
changing this timeout.

[boris: replaced pr_info() with pr_notice()]

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211102091944.17487-1-jgross@suse.com
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 40fdea0284bb20814399da0484a658a96c735d90 upstream.

When running as PVH or HVM guest with actual memory &lt; max memory the
hypervisor is using "populate on demand" in order to allow the guest
to balloon down from its maximum memory size. For this to work
correctly the guest must not touch more memory pages than its target
memory size as otherwise the PoD cache will be exhausted and the guest
is crashed as a result of that.

In extreme cases ballooning down might not be finished today before
the init process is started, which can consume lots of memory.

In order to avoid random boot crashes in such cases, add a late init
call to wait for ballooning down having finished for PVH/HVM guests.

Warn on console if initial ballooning fails, panic() after stalling
for more than 3 minutes per default. Add a module parameter for
changing this timeout.

[boris: replaced pr_info() with pr_notice()]

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211102091944.17487-1-jgross@suse.com
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>docs: Fix infiniband uverbs minor number</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-28T13:04:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e69c28362116c0319faff84147aa98dc3be67dec'/>
<id>e69c28362116c0319faff84147aa98dc3be67dec</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8d7e415d55610d503fdb8815344846b72d194a40 ]

Starting from the beginning of infiniband subsystem, the uverbs char
devices start from 192 as a minor number, see
commit bc38a6abdd5a ("[PATCH] IB uverbs: core implementation").

This patch updates the admin guide documentation to reflect it.

Fixes: 9d85025b0418 ("docs-rst: create an user's manual book")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bad03e6bcde45550c01e12908a6fe7dfa4770703.1627477347.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8d7e415d55610d503fdb8815344846b72d194a40 ]

Starting from the beginning of infiniband subsystem, the uverbs char
devices start from 192 as a minor number, see
commit bc38a6abdd5a ("[PATCH] IB uverbs: core implementation").

This patch updates the admin guide documentation to reflect it.

Fixes: 9d85025b0418 ("docs-rst: create an user's manual book")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bad03e6bcde45550c01e12908a6fe7dfa4770703.1627477347.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>clocksource: Retry clock read if long delays detected</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:53:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-27T19:01:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dba9cda5aa9969a93d068cbea7a7668233a14882'/>
<id>dba9cda5aa9969a93d068cbea7a7668233a14882</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit db3a34e17433de2390eb80d436970edcebd0ca3e ]

When the clocksource watchdog marks a clock as unstable, this might be due
to that clock being unstable or it might be due to delays that happen to
occur between the reads of the two clocks.  Yes, interrupts are disabled
across those two reads, but there are no shortage of things that can delay
interrupts-disabled regions of code ranging from SMI handlers to vCPU
preemption.  It would be good to have some indication as to why the clock
was marked unstable.

Therefore, re-read the watchdog clock on either side of the read from the
clock under test.  If the watchdog clock shows an excessive time delta
between its pair of reads, the reads are retried.

The maximum number of retries is specified by a new kernel boot parameter
clocksource.max_cswd_read_retries, which defaults to three, that is, up to
four reads, one initial and up to three retries.  If more than one retry
was required, a message is printed on the console (the occasional single
retry is expected behavior, especially in guest OSes).  If the maximum
number of retries is exceeded, the clock under test will be marked
unstable.  However, the probability of this happening due to various sorts
of delays is quite small.  In addition, the reason (clock-read delays) for
the unstable marking will be apparent.

Reported-by: Chris Mason &lt;clm@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Feng Tang &lt;feng.tang@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527190124.440372-1-paulmck@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit db3a34e17433de2390eb80d436970edcebd0ca3e ]

When the clocksource watchdog marks a clock as unstable, this might be due
to that clock being unstable or it might be due to delays that happen to
occur between the reads of the two clocks.  Yes, interrupts are disabled
across those two reads, but there are no shortage of things that can delay
interrupts-disabled regions of code ranging from SMI handlers to vCPU
preemption.  It would be good to have some indication as to why the clock
was marked unstable.

Therefore, re-read the watchdog clock on either side of the read from the
clock under test.  If the watchdog clock shows an excessive time delta
between its pair of reads, the reads are retried.

The maximum number of retries is specified by a new kernel boot parameter
clocksource.max_cswd_read_retries, which defaults to three, that is, up to
four reads, one initial and up to three retries.  If more than one retry
was required, a message is printed on the console (the occasional single
retry is expected behavior, especially in guest OSes).  If the maximum
number of retries is exceeded, the clock under test will be marked
unstable.  However, the probability of this happening due to various sorts
of delays is quite small.  In addition, the reason (clock-read delays) for
the unstable marking will be apparent.

Reported-by: Chris Mason &lt;clm@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Feng Tang &lt;feng.tang@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527190124.440372-1-paulmck@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm integrity: conditionally disable "recalculate" feature</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mpatocka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-20T18:59:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2d8848edc96b43d1dd8823a533e702953048b33e'/>
<id>2d8848edc96b43d1dd8823a533e702953048b33e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5c02406428d5219c367c5f53457698c58bc5f917 upstream.

Otherwise a malicious user could (ab)use the "recalculate" feature
that makes dm-integrity calculate the checksums in the background
while the device is already usable. When the system restarts before all
checksums have been calculated, the calculation continues where it was
interrupted even if the recalculate feature is not requested the next
time the dm device is set up.

Disable recalculating if we use internal_hash or journal_hash with a
key (e.g. HMAC) and we don't have the "legacy_recalculate" flag.

This may break activation of a volume, created by an older kernel,
that is not yet fully recalculated -- if this happens, the user should
add the "legacy_recalculate" flag to constructor parameters.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Daniel Glockner &lt;dg@emlix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5c02406428d5219c367c5f53457698c58bc5f917 upstream.

Otherwise a malicious user could (ab)use the "recalculate" feature
that makes dm-integrity calculate the checksums in the background
while the device is already usable. When the system restarts before all
checksums have been calculated, the calculation continues where it was
interrupted even if the recalculate feature is not requested the next
time the dm device is set up.

Disable recalculating if we use internal_hash or journal_hash with a
key (e.g. HMAC) and we don't have the "legacy_recalculate" flag.

This may break activation of a volume, created by an older kernel,
that is not yet fully recalculated -- if this happens, the user should
add the "legacy_recalculate" flag to constructor parameters.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Daniel Glockner &lt;dg@emlix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/xen: Add xen_no_vector_callback option to test PCI INTX delivery</title>
<updated>2021-01-27T10:47:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw@amazon.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-06T15:39:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5fa6987258a757a9fae70ff28188dff07f01bf50'/>
<id>5fa6987258a757a9fae70ff28188dff07f01bf50</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b36b0fe96af13460278bf9b173beced1bd15f85d ]

It's useful to be able to test non-vector event channel delivery, to make
sure Linux will work properly on older Xen which doesn't have it.

It's also useful for those working on Xen and Xen-compatible hypervisors,
because there are guest kernels still in active use which use PCI INTX
even when vector delivery is available.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-4-dwmw2@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b36b0fe96af13460278bf9b173beced1bd15f85d ]

It's useful to be able to test non-vector event channel delivery, to make
sure Linux will work properly on older Xen which doesn't have it.

It's also useful for those working on Xen and Xen-compatible hypervisors,
because there are guest kernels still in active use which use PCI INTX
even when vector delivery is available.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-4-dwmw2@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>USB: UAS: introduce a quirk to set no_write_same</title>
<updated>2020-12-21T12:27:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Neukum</name>
<email>oneukum@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-09T15:26:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4ad8fc6cce018467c50ae18a70636c062d0d6e81'/>
<id>4ad8fc6cce018467c50ae18a70636c062d0d6e81</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8010622c86ca5bb44bc98492f5968726fc7c7a21 upstream.

UAS does not share the pessimistic assumption storage is making that
devices cannot deal with WRITE_SAME.  A few devices supported by UAS,
are reported to not deal well with WRITE_SAME. Those need a quirk.

Add it to the device that needs it.

Reported-by: David C. Partridge &lt;david.partridge@perdrix.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum &lt;oneukum@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209152639.9195-1-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8010622c86ca5bb44bc98492f5968726fc7c7a21 upstream.

UAS does not share the pessimistic assumption storage is making that
devices cannot deal with WRITE_SAME.  A few devices supported by UAS,
are reported to not deal well with WRITE_SAME. Those need a quirk.

Add it to the device that needs it.

Reported-by: David C. Partridge &lt;david.partridge@perdrix.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum &lt;oneukum@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209152639.9195-1-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T09:14:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-19T23:35:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=09495b5f7aab84cf41ef54259cfea4da86a7df98'/>
<id>09495b5f7aab84cf41ef54259cfea4da86a7df98</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T09:14:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-19T23:35:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b65458b6be8032c5179d4f562038575d7b3a6be3'/>
<id>b65458b6be8032c5179d4f562038575d7b3a6be3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.

[backporting note: we need to mark some exception handlers as out-of-line
 because the flushing makes them take too much space -- dja]

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.

[backporting note: we need to mark some exception handlers as out-of-line
 because the flushing makes them take too much space -- dja]

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:43:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:47:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1d628c330fa6e1fe58b00624d46b4ce0a2502f54'/>
<id>1d628c330fa6e1fe58b00624d46b4ce0a2502f54</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e99502f76271d6bc4e374fe368c50c67a1fd3070 upstream.

In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.

In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some
time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a
worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in.

The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable
via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the
maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen
after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an
only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests
performed an event storm).

How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another
parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the
value was chosen after testing with different delay values).

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wl@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e99502f76271d6bc4e374fe368c50c67a1fd3070 upstream.

In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.

In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some
time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a
worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in.

The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable
via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the
maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen
after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an
only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests
performed an event storm).

How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another
parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the
value was chosen after testing with different delay values).

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wl@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Allow multiple bits in clearcpuid= parameter</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:57:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arvind Sankar</name>
<email>nivedita@alum.mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T21:39:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7e297c83e64df6981509943ebc603c487abdea8b'/>
<id>7e297c83e64df6981509943ebc603c487abdea8b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0a4bb5e5507a585532cc413125b921c8546fc39f ]

Commit

  0c2a3913d6f5 ("x86/fpu: Parse clearcpuid= as early XSAVE argument")

changed clearcpuid parsing from __setup() to cmdline_find_option().
While the __setup() function would have been called for each clearcpuid=
parameter on the command line, cmdline_find_option() will only return
the last one, so the change effectively made it impossible to disable
more than one bit.

Allow a comma-separated list of bit numbers as the argument for
clearcpuid to allow multiple bits to be disabled again. Log the bits
being disabled for informational purposes.

Also fix the check on the return value of cmdline_find_option(). It
returns -1 when the option is not found, so testing as a boolean is
incorrect.

Fixes: 0c2a3913d6f5 ("x86/fpu: Parse clearcpuid= as early XSAVE argument")
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar &lt;nivedita@alum.mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907213919.2423441-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0a4bb5e5507a585532cc413125b921c8546fc39f ]

Commit

  0c2a3913d6f5 ("x86/fpu: Parse clearcpuid= as early XSAVE argument")

changed clearcpuid parsing from __setup() to cmdline_find_option().
While the __setup() function would have been called for each clearcpuid=
parameter on the command line, cmdline_find_option() will only return
the last one, so the change effectively made it impossible to disable
more than one bit.

Allow a comma-separated list of bit numbers as the argument for
clearcpuid to allow multiple bits to be disabled again. Log the bits
being disabled for informational purposes.

Also fix the check on the return value of cmdline_find_option(). It
returns -1 when the option is not found, so testing as a boolean is
incorrect.

Fixes: 0c2a3913d6f5 ("x86/fpu: Parse clearcpuid= as early XSAVE argument")
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar &lt;nivedita@alum.mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907213919.2423441-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
