linux-stable.git/Documentation/admin-guide, branch v4.14.166

USB: documentation: flags on usb-storage versus UAS

2019-12-17T19:39:03+00:00

commit 65cc8bf99349f651a0a2cee69333525fe581f306 upstream.

Document which flags work storage, UAS or both

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum 
Cc: stable 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191114112758.32747-4-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status

2019-12-01T08:14:22+00:00

commit 64870ed1b12e235cfca3f6c6da75b542c973ff78 upstream.

For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.

For example, with only the "mds=off" option:

  vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
  vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable

The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.

Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.

Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.

 [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]

Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross 
Cc: 
Cc: Pawan Gupta 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Tim Chen 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: Tyler Hicks 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kvm: x86: mmu: Recovery of shattered NX large pages

2019-11-12T18:19:08+00:00

commit 1aa9b9572b10529c2e64e2b8f44025d86e124308 upstream.

The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution.  This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.

By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation

2019-11-12T18:19:08+00:00

commit b8e8c8303ff28c61046a4d0f6ea99aea609a7dc0 upstream.

With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.

Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.

Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.

This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen.  With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.

[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]

Originally-by: Junaid Shahid 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Documentation: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation

2019-11-12T18:19:05+00:00

commit 7f00cc8d4a51074eb0ad4c3f16c15757b1ddfb7d upstream.

Add the initial ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation.

[ tglx: Add it to the index so it gets actually built. ]

Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias 
Signed-off-by: Nelson D'Souza 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort

2019-11-12T18:19:02+00:00

commit a7a248c593e4fd7a67c50b5f5318fe42a0db335e upstream.

Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of
the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation,
guidance for system administrators.

 [ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ]

Co-developed-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias 

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross 
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter

2019-11-12T18:19:01+00:00

commit 7531a3596e3272d1f6841e0d601a614555dc6b65 upstream.

Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature
enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto
disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX.

More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html

 [ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default

2019-11-12T18:18:59+00:00

commit 95c5824f75f3ba4c9e8e5a4b1a623c95390ac266 upstream.

Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.

Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.

 [ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
       - Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
       - Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/xen: Return from panic notifier

2019-11-06T11:43:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit c6875f3aacf2a5a913205accddabf0bfb75cac76 ]

Currently execution of panic() continues until Xen's panic notifier
(xen_panic_event()) is called at which point we make a hypercall that
never returns.

This means that any notifier that is supposed to be called later as
well as significant part of panic() code (such as pstore writes from
kmsg_dump()) is never executed.

There is no reason for xen_panic_event() to be this last point in
execution since panic()'s emergency_restart() will call into
xen_emergency_restart() from where we can perform our hypercall.

Nevertheless, we will provide xen_legacy_crash boot option that will
preserve original behavior during crash. This option could be used,
for example, if running kernel dumper (which happens after panic
notifiers) is undesirable.

Reported-by: James Dingwall 
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky 
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

2019-10-29T08:17:30+00:00

[ Upstream commit a111b7c0f20e13b54df2fa959b3dc0bdf1925ae6 ]

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
[will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman