[ Upstream commit db3a34e17433de2390eb80d436970edcebd0ca3e ] When the clocksource watchdog marks a clock as unstable, this might be due to that clock being unstable or it might be due to delays that happen to occur between the reads of the two clocks. Yes, interrupts are disabled across those two reads, but there are no shortage of things that can delay interrupts-disabled regions of code ranging from SMI handlers to vCPU preemption. It would be good to have some indication as to why the clock was marked unstable. Therefore, re-read the watchdog clock on either side of the read from the clock under test. If the watchdog clock shows an excessive time delta between its pair of reads, the reads are retried. The maximum number of retries is specified by a new kernel boot parameter clocksource.max_cswd_read_retries, which defaults to three, that is, up to four reads, one initial and up to three retries. If more than one retry was required, a message is printed on the console (the occasional single retry is expected behavior, especially in guest OSes). If the maximum number of retries is exceeded, the clock under test will be marked unstable. However, the probability of this happening due to various sorts of delays is quite small. In addition, the reason (clock-read delays) for the unstable marking will be apparent. Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527190124.440372-1-paulmck@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b36b0fe96af13460278bf9b173beced1bd15f85d ] It's useful to be able to test non-vector event channel delivery, to make sure Linux will work properly on older Xen which doesn't have it. It's also useful for those working on Xen and Xen-compatible hypervisors, because there are guest kernels still in active use which use PCI INTX even when vector delivery is available. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-4-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8010622c86ca5bb44bc98492f5968726fc7c7a21 upstream. UAS does not share the pessimistic assumption storage is making that devices cannot deal with WRITE_SAME. A few devices supported by UAS, are reported to not deal well with WRITE_SAME. Those need a quirk. Add it to the device that needs it. Reported-by: David C. Partridge <david.partridge@perdrix.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209152639.9195-1-oneukum@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked. However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack. This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses. This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked. However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack. This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry. This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Pull more xen updates from Juergen Gross: - a series for the Xen pv block drivers adding module parameters for better control of resource usge - a cleanup series for the Xen event driver * tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1c-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: Documentation: add xen.fifo_events kernel parameter description xen/events: unmask a fifo event channel only if it was masked xen/events: only register debug interrupt for 2-level events xen/events: make struct irq_info private to events_base.c xen: remove no longer used functions xen-blkfront: Apply changed parameter name to the document xen-blkfront: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants xen-blkback: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants
The kernel boot parameter xen.fifo_events isn't listed in Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt. Add it. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201022094907.28560-6-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Pull more xen updates from Juergen Gross: - A single patch to fix the Xen security issue XSA-331 (malicious guests can DoS dom0 by triggering NULL-pointer dereferences or access to stale data). - A larger series to fix the Xen security issue XSA-332 (malicious guests can DoS dom0 by sending events at high frequency leading to dom0's vcpus being busy in IRQ handling for elongated times). * tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1b-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: xen/events: block rogue events for some time xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events xen/events: use a common cpu hotplug hook for event channels xen/events: switch user event channels to lateeoi model xen/pciback: use lateeoi irq binding xen/pvcallsback: use lateeoi irq binding xen/scsiback: use lateeoi irq binding xen/netback: use lateeoi irq binding xen/blkback: use lateeoi irq binding xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework xen/events: fix race in evtchn_fifo_unmask() xen/events: add a proper barrier to 2-level uevent unmasking xen/events: avoid removing an event channel while handling it
In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result. In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in. The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests performed an event storm). How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the value was chosen after testing with different delay values). This is part of XSA-332. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Pull RCU changes from Ingo Molnar: - Debugging for smp_call_function() - RT raw/non-raw lock ordering fixes - Strict grace periods for KASAN - New smp_call_function() torture test - Torture-test updates - Documentation updates - Miscellaneous fixes [ This doesn't actually pull the tag - I've dropped the last merge from the RCU branch due to questions about the series. - Linus ] * tag 'core-rcu-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (77 commits) smp: Make symbol 'csd_bug_count' static kernel/smp: Provide CSD lock timeout diagnostics smp: Add source and destination CPUs to __call_single_data rcu: Shrink each possible cpu krcp rcu/segcblist: Prevent useless GP start if no CBs to accelerate torture: Add gdb support rcutorture: Allow pointer leaks to test diagnostic code rcutorture: Hoist OOM registry up one level refperf: Avoid null pointer dereference when buf fails to allocate rcutorture: Properly synchronize with OOM notifier rcutorture: Properly set rcu_fwds for OOM handling torture: Add kvm.sh --help and update help message rcutorture: Add CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST to TREE05 torture: Update initrd documentation rcutorture: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones locktorture: Make function torture_percpu_rwsem_init() static torture: document --allcpus argument added to the kvm.sh script rcutorture: Output number of elapsed grace periods rcutorture: Remove KCSAN stubs rcu: Remove unused "cpu" parameter from rcu_report_qs_rdp() ...