commit 8010622c86ca5bb44bc98492f5968726fc7c7a21 upstream.

UAS does not share the pessimistic assumption storage is making that
devices cannot deal with WRITE_SAME.  A few devices supported by UAS,
are reported to not deal well with WRITE_SAME. Those need a quirk.

Add it to the device that needs it.

Reported-by: David C. Partridge <david.partridge@perdrix.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209152639.9195-1-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

Pull more xen updates from Juergen Gross:

 - a series for the Xen pv block drivers adding module parameters for
   better control of resource usge

 - a cleanup series for the Xen event driver

* tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1c-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  Documentation: add xen.fifo_events kernel parameter description
  xen/events: unmask a fifo event channel only if it was masked
  xen/events: only register debug interrupt for 2-level events
  xen/events: make struct irq_info private to events_base.c
  xen: remove no longer used functions
  xen-blkfront: Apply changed parameter name to the document
  xen-blkfront: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants
  xen-blkback: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants

The kernel boot parameter xen.fifo_events isn't listed in
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt. Add it.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201022094907.28560-6-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

Pull more xen updates from Juergen Gross:

 - A single patch to fix the Xen security issue XSA-331 (malicious
   guests can DoS dom0 by triggering NULL-pointer dereferences or access
   to stale data).

 - A larger series to fix the Xen security issue XSA-332 (malicious
   guests can DoS dom0 by sending events at high frequency leading to
   dom0's vcpus being busy in IRQ handling for elongated times).

* tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1b-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/events: block rogue events for some time
  xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events
  xen/events: use a common cpu hotplug hook for event channels
  xen/events: switch user event channels to lateeoi model
  xen/pciback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/pvcallsback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/scsiback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/netback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/blkback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework
  xen/events: fix race in evtchn_fifo_unmask()
  xen/events: add a proper barrier to 2-level uevent unmasking
  xen/events: avoid removing an event channel while handling it

In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.

In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some
time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a
worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in.

The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable
via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the
maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen
after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an
only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests
performed an event storm).

How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another
parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the
value was chosen after testing with different delay values).

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>

Pull RCU changes from Ingo Molnar:

 - Debugging for smp_call_function()

 - RT raw/non-raw lock ordering fixes

 - Strict grace periods for KASAN

 - New smp_call_function() torture test

 - Torture-test updates

 - Documentation updates

 - Miscellaneous fixes

[ This doesn't actually pull the tag - I've dropped the last merge from
  the RCU branch due to questions about the series.   - Linus ]

* tag 'core-rcu-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (77 commits)
  smp: Make symbol 'csd_bug_count' static
  kernel/smp: Provide CSD lock timeout diagnostics
  smp: Add source and destination CPUs to __call_single_data
  rcu: Shrink each possible cpu krcp
  rcu/segcblist: Prevent useless GP start if no CBs to accelerate
  torture: Add gdb support
  rcutorture: Allow pointer leaks to test diagnostic code
  rcutorture: Hoist OOM registry up one level
  refperf: Avoid null pointer dereference when buf fails to allocate
  rcutorture: Properly synchronize with OOM notifier
  rcutorture: Properly set rcu_fwds for OOM handling
  torture: Add kvm.sh --help and update help message
  rcutorture: Add CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST to TREE05
  torture: Update initrd documentation
  rcutorture: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
  locktorture: Make function torture_percpu_rwsem_init() static
  torture: document --allcpus argument added to the kvm.sh script
  rcutorture: Output number of elapsed grace periods
  rcutorture: Remove KCSAN stubs
  rcu: Remove unused "cpu" parameter from rcu_report_qs_rdp()
  ...

Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
 "155 patches.

  Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (dax, debug, thp,
  readahead, page-poison, util, memory-hotplug, zram, cleanups), misc,
  core-kernel, get_maintainer, MAINTAINERS, lib, bitops, checkpatch,
  binfmt, ramfs, autofs, nilfs, rapidio, panic, relay, kgdb, ubsan,
  romfs, and fault-injection"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (155 commits)
  lib, uaccess: add failure injection to usercopy functions
  lib, include/linux: add usercopy failure capability
  ROMFS: support inode blocks calculation
  ubsan: introduce CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS for Clang
  sched.h: drop in_ubsan field when UBSAN is in trap mode
  scripts/gdb/tasks: add headers and improve spacing format
  scripts/gdb/proc: add struct mount & struct super_block addr in lx-mounts command
  kernel/relay.c: drop unneeded initialization
  panic: dump registers on panic_on_warn
  rapidio: fix the missed put_device() for rio_mport_add_riodev
  rapidio: fix error handling path
  nilfs2: fix some kernel-doc warnings for nilfs2
  autofs: harden ioctl table
  ramfs: fix nommu mmap with gaps in the page cache
  mm: remove the now-unnecessary mmget_still_valid() hack
  mm/gup: take mmap_lock in get_dump_page()
  binfmt_elf, binfmt_elf_fdpic: use a VMA list snapshot
  coredump: rework elf/elf_fdpic vma_dump_size() into common helper
  coredump: refactor page range dumping into common helper
  coredump: let dump_emit() bail out on short writes
  ...

Patch series "add fault injection to user memory access", v3.

The goal of this series is to improve testing of fault-tolerance in usages
of user memory access functions, by adding support for fault injection.

syzkaller/syzbot are using the existing fault injection modes and will use
this particular feature also.

The first patch adds failure injection capability for usercopy functions.
The second changes usercopy functions to use this new failure capability
(copy_from_user, ...).  The third patch adds get/put/clear_user failures
to x86.

This patch (of 3):

Add a failure injection capability to improve testing of fault-tolerance
in usages of user memory access functions.

Add CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_USERCOPY to enable faults in usercopy
functions.  The should_fail_usercopy function is to be called by these
functions (copy_from_user, get_user, ...) in order to fail or not.

Signed-off-by: Albert van der Linde <alinde@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831171733.955393-1-alinde@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831171733.955393-2-alinde@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>