linux-stable.git/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt, branch linux-6.8.y Linux kernel stable tree cpu: Ignore "mitigations" kernel parameter if CPU_MITIGATIONS=n 2024-05-30T07:48:48+00:00 Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com 2024-04-20T00:05:55+00:00 386248134388f4c3f26f821a516dff8aded5c499 [ Upstream commit ce0abef6a1d540acef85068e0e82bdf1fbeeb0e9 ] Explicitly disallow enabling mitigations at runtime for kernels that were built with CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS=n, as some architectures may omit code entirely if mitigations are disabled at compile time. E.g. on x86, a large pile of Kconfigs are buried behind CPU_MITIGATIONS, and trying to provide sane behavior for retroactively enabling mitigations is extremely difficult, bordering on impossible. E.g. page table isolation and call depth tracking require build-time support, BHI mitigations will still be off without additional kernel parameters, etc. [ bp: Touchups. ] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420000556.2645001-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit ce0abef6a1d540acef85068e0e82bdf1fbeeb0e9 ]

Explicitly disallow enabling mitigations at runtime for kernels that were
built with CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS=n, as some architectures may omit code
entirely if mitigations are disabled at compile time.

E.g. on x86, a large pile of Kconfigs are buried behind CPU_MITIGATIONS,
and trying to provide sane behavior for retroactively enabling mitigations
is extremely difficult, bordering on impossible.  E.g. page table isolation
and call depth tracking require build-time support, BHI mitigations will
still be off without additional kernel parameters, etc.

  [ bp: Touchups. ]

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420000556.2645001-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto 2024-04-17T09:23:41+00:00 Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org 2024-04-11T05:40:50+00:00 4e017a914398ebf5a13e63e11fb8d87a9f983509 commit 36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a upstream. Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a upstream.

Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only
mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful.

Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation 2024-04-17T09:23:41+00:00 Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org 2024-04-11T05:40:48+00:00 267b24677628df6706806ea9d2f57da59aa40fc4 commit 5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a upstream. While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still other low-hanging fruit remaining. Don't classify it as a mitigation and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't have a HW or SW mitigation enabled. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a upstream.

While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still
other low-hanging fruit remaining.  Don't classify it as a mitigation
and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't
have a HW or SW mitigation enabled.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation 2024-04-17T09:23:40+00:00 Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org 2024-04-11T05:40:45+00:00 2fa1969f360e16230a7812c89426bee7104679be commit dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30 upstream. Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30 upstream.

Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/bhi: Mitigate KVM by default 2024-04-10T14:38:24+00:00 Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com 2024-03-11T15:57:09+00:00 2bf604dc494f9f747eee62e7d46b2c179aa243dc commit 95a6ccbdc7199a14b71ad8901cb788ba7fb5167b upstream. BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable. Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode, software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode. Suggested-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 95a6ccbdc7199a14b71ad8901cb788ba7fb5167b upstream.

BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software
mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario
where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying
system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable.

Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious
guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when
hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode,
software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode.

Suggested-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob 2024-04-10T14:38:24+00:00 Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com 2024-03-11T15:57:05+00:00 a39bfa52671beb750fa2e1c7400469cde9c8ff9f commit ec9404e40e8f36421a2b66ecb76dc2209fe7f3ef upstream. Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI). Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation: auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available. on - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available, otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit. off - Turn off BHI mitigation. The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence mitigation. This is because of the hardening done in the syscall dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ec9404e40e8f36421a2b66ecb76dc2209fe7f3ef upstream.

Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).

Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation:

 auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available.
 on   - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available,
        otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and
	VMexit.
 off  - Turn off BHI mitigation.

The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence
mitigation.  This is because of the hardening done in the syscall
dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT 2024-04-03T13:32:32+00:00 Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de 2024-02-02T16:29:32+00:00 b06b8be7f13703f5448063c61a2ca8092a123288 commit 29956748339aa8757a7e2f927a8679dd08f24bb6 upstream. It was meant well at the time but nothing's using it so get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202163510.GDZb0Zvj8qOndvFOiZ@fat_crate.local Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 29956748339aa8757a7e2f927a8679dd08f24bb6 upstream.

It was meant well at the time but nothing's using it so get rid of it.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202163510.GDZb0Zvj8qOndvFOiZ@fat_crate.local
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) 2024-03-15T14:48:13+00:00 Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com 2024-03-11T19:29:43+00:00 c8a1b14f43bb89a62c1471ec2931f152b37b3782 commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream. RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors. Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support SMT. Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter "reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation. For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.

RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers
and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.

Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear
the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support
SMT.

Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by
default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to
userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter
"reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.

For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Merge tag 'loongarch-6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson 2024-01-19T21:30:49+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2024-01-19T21:30:49+00:00 24fdd5189914b36102cb51626a890a2d84501993 Pull LoongArch updates from Huacai Chen: - Raise minimum clang version to 18.0.0 - Enable initial Rust support for LoongArch - Add built-in dtb support for LoongArch - Use generic interface to support crashkernel=X,[high,low] - Some bug fixes and other small changes - Update the default config file. * tag 'loongarch-6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson: (22 commits) MAINTAINERS: Add BPF JIT for LOONGARCH entry LoongArch: Update Loongson-3 default config file LoongArch: BPF: Prevent out-of-bounds memory access LoongArch: BPF: Support 64-bit pointers to kfuncs LoongArch: Fix definition of ftrace_regs_set_instruction_pointer() LoongArch: Use generic interface to support crashkernel=X,[high,low] LoongArch: Fix and simplify fcsr initialization on execve() LoongArch: Let cores_io_master cover the largest NR_CPUS LoongArch: Change SHMLBA from SZ_64K to PAGE_SIZE LoongArch: Add a missing call to efi_esrt_init() LoongArch: Parsing CPU-related information from DTS LoongArch: dts: DeviceTree for Loongson-2K2000 LoongArch: dts: DeviceTree for Loongson-2K1000 LoongArch: dts: DeviceTree for Loongson-2K0500 LoongArch: Allow device trees be built into the kernel dt-bindings: interrupt-controller: loongson,liointc: Fix dtbs_check warning for interrupt-names dt-bindings: interrupt-controller: loongson,liointc: Fix dtbs_check warning for reg-names dt-bindings: loongarch: Add Loongson SoC boards compatibles dt-bindings: loongarch: Add CPU bindings for LoongArch LoongArch: Enable initial Rust support ... 
Pull LoongArch updates from Huacai Chen:

 - Raise minimum clang version to 18.0.0

 - Enable initial Rust support for LoongArch

 - Add built-in dtb support for LoongArch

 - Use generic interface to support crashkernel=X,[high,low]

 - Some bug fixes and other small changes

 - Update the default config file.

* tag 'loongarch-6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson: (22 commits)
  MAINTAINERS: Add BPF JIT for LOONGARCH entry
  LoongArch: Update Loongson-3 default config file
  LoongArch: BPF: Prevent out-of-bounds memory access
  LoongArch: BPF: Support 64-bit pointers to kfuncs
  LoongArch: Fix definition of ftrace_regs_set_instruction_pointer()
  LoongArch: Use generic interface to support crashkernel=X,[high,low]
  LoongArch: Fix and simplify fcsr initialization on execve()
  LoongArch: Let cores_io_master cover the largest NR_CPUS
  LoongArch: Change SHMLBA from SZ_64K to PAGE_SIZE
  LoongArch: Add a missing call to efi_esrt_init()
  LoongArch: Parsing CPU-related information from DTS
  LoongArch: dts: DeviceTree for Loongson-2K2000
  LoongArch: dts: DeviceTree for Loongson-2K1000
  LoongArch: dts: DeviceTree for Loongson-2K0500
  LoongArch: Allow device trees be built into the kernel
  dt-bindings: interrupt-controller: loongson,liointc: Fix dtbs_check warning for interrupt-names
  dt-bindings: interrupt-controller: loongson,liointc: Fix dtbs_check warning for reg-names
  dt-bindings: loongarch: Add Loongson SoC boards compatibles
  dt-bindings: loongarch: Add CPU bindings for LoongArch
  LoongArch: Enable initial Rust support
  ...
Merge tag 'usb-6.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb 2024-01-18T19:43:55+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2024-01-18T19:43:55+00:00 8c94ccc7cd691472461448f98e2372c75849406c Pull USB / Thunderbolt updates from Greg KH: "Here is the big set of USB and Thunderbolt changes for 6.8-rc1. Included in here are the following: - Thunderbolt subsystem and driver updates for USB 4 hardware and issues reported by real devices - xhci driver updates - dwc3 driver updates - uvc_video gadget driver updates - typec driver updates - gadget string functions cleaned up - other small changes All of these have been in the linux-next tree for a while with no reported issues" * tag 'usb-6.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb: (169 commits) usb: typec: tipd: fix use of device-specific init function usb: typec: tipd: Separate reset for TPS6598x usb: mon: Fix atomicity violation in mon_bin_vma_fault usb: gadget: uvc: Remove nested locking usb: gadget: uvc: Fix use are free during STREAMOFF usb: typec: class: fix typec_altmode_put_partner to put plugs dt-bindings: usb: dwc3: Limit num-hc-interrupters definition dt-bindings: usb: xhci: Add num-hc-interrupters definition xhci: add support to allocate several interrupters USB: core: Use device_driver directly in struct usb_driver and usb_device_driver arm64: dts: mediatek: mt8195: Add 'rx-fifo-depth' for cherry usb: xhci-mtk: fix a short packet issue of gen1 isoc-in transfer dt-bindings: usb: mtk-xhci: add a property for Gen1 isoc-in transfer issue arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: Remove PNoC clock from MSS arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: Remove AGGRE2 clock from SLPI arm64: dts: qcom: msm8998: Remove AGGRE2 clock from SLPI arm64: dts: qcom: msm8939: Drop RPM bus clocks arm64: dts: qcom: sdm630: Drop RPM bus clocks arm64: dts: qcom: qcs404: Drop RPM bus clocks arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: Drop RPM bus clocks ... 
Pull USB / Thunderbolt updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the big set of USB and Thunderbolt changes for 6.8-rc1.
  Included in here are the following:

   - Thunderbolt subsystem and driver updates for USB 4 hardware and
     issues reported by real devices

   - xhci driver updates

   - dwc3 driver updates

   - uvc_video gadget driver updates

   - typec driver updates

   - gadget string functions cleaned up

   - other small changes

  All of these have been in the linux-next tree for a while with no
  reported issues"

* tag 'usb-6.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb: (169 commits)
  usb: typec: tipd: fix use of device-specific init function
  usb: typec: tipd: Separate reset for TPS6598x
  usb: mon: Fix atomicity violation in mon_bin_vma_fault
  usb: gadget: uvc: Remove nested locking
  usb: gadget: uvc: Fix use are free during STREAMOFF
  usb: typec: class: fix typec_altmode_put_partner to put plugs
  dt-bindings: usb: dwc3: Limit num-hc-interrupters definition
  dt-bindings: usb: xhci: Add num-hc-interrupters definition
  xhci: add support to allocate several interrupters
  USB: core: Use device_driver directly in struct usb_driver and usb_device_driver
  arm64: dts: mediatek: mt8195: Add 'rx-fifo-depth' for cherry
  usb: xhci-mtk: fix a short packet issue of gen1 isoc-in transfer
  dt-bindings: usb: mtk-xhci: add a property for Gen1 isoc-in transfer issue
  arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: Remove PNoC clock from MSS
  arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: Remove AGGRE2 clock from SLPI
  arm64: dts: qcom: msm8998: Remove AGGRE2 clock from SLPI
  arm64: dts: qcom: msm8939: Drop RPM bus clocks
  arm64: dts: qcom: sdm630: Drop RPM bus clocks
  arm64: dts: qcom: qcs404: Drop RPM bus clocks
  arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: Drop RPM bus clocks
  ...