<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git, branch v6.6.154</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 6.6.154</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=93e0c9521fa8e477120cde68ae56932c379b853b'/>
<id>93e0c9521fa8e477120cde68ae56932c379b853b</id>
<content type='text'>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260825132541.813800447@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;florian.fainelli@broadcom.com&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Tested-by: Wentao Guan &lt;guanwentao@uniontech.com&gt;
Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan &lt;barryn@pobox.com&gt;
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield &lt;bacs@librecast.net&gt;
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Peter Schneider &lt;pschneider1968@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260825132541.813800447@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;florian.fainelli@broadcom.com&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Tested-by: Wentao Guan &lt;guanwentao@uniontech.com&gt;
Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan &lt;barryn@pobox.com&gt;
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield &lt;bacs@librecast.net&gt;
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Peter Schneider &lt;pschneider1968@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-27T06:08:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e907bf694ed55bdfe421be99dba35751a655df25'/>
<id>e907bf694ed55bdfe421be99dba35751a655df25</id>
<content type='text'>
When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB),
BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP
(with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).

However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:

1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space
   before the MAC header (p-&gt;mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes
   mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check
   with p-&gt;mac_header &lt; 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the
   temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb-&gt;head,
   causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb-&gt;mac_header.
2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q /
   ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because
   p-&gt;protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.
3. It checked p-&gt;encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-&gt;encap_mark,
   allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate
   beyond 64KB.

Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce:
- NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-&gt;proto == IPPROTO_TCP
- Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-&gt;encap_mark &amp;&amp; !p-&gt;encapsulation)
- Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6
- If ETH_P_IPV6, p-&gt;mac_header must be at least
  sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)

Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot
become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at &lt;= 64KB and delivered intact without
dropping.

This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was
rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX
side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like
6.18.y.

Fixes: 0fe79f28bfaf ("net: allow gro_max_size to exceed 65536")
Fixes: b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
Reported-by: Sam Dlinn &lt;sledge@meta.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB),
BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP
(with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).

However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:

1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space
   before the MAC header (p-&gt;mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes
   mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check
   with p-&gt;mac_header &lt; 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the
   temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb-&gt;head,
   causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb-&gt;mac_header.
2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q /
   ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because
   p-&gt;protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.
3. It checked p-&gt;encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-&gt;encap_mark,
   allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate
   beyond 64KB.

Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce:
- NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-&gt;proto == IPPROTO_TCP
- Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-&gt;encap_mark &amp;&amp; !p-&gt;encapsulation)
- Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6
- If ETH_P_IPV6, p-&gt;mac_header must be at least
  sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)

Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot
become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at &lt;= 64KB and delivered intact without
dropping.

This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was
rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX
side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like
6.18.y.

Fixes: 0fe79f28bfaf ("net: allow gro_max_size to exceed 65536")
Fixes: b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
Reported-by: Sam Dlinn &lt;sledge@meta.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_event: validate LE Set CIG Parameters response</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laxman Acharya Padhya</name>
<email>acharyalaxman8848@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-01T18:09:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26741d178f31932c9018b36b7953e6dc391436a4'/>
<id>26741d178f31932c9018b36b7953e6dc391436a4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0acd4eeb4b225b9bebbf9ef96cc10cdd79b94899 upstream.

The Command Complete dispatch validates only the fixed part of the LE Set
CIG Parameters response. After that part is pulled from the skb,
hci_cc_le_set_cig_params() trusts num_handles and reads each entry in the
trailing handle array.

Matching num_handles against the command's num_cis does not guarantee
that the response contains the advertised handles. A truncated response
from a malfunctioning controller can therefore make the handler read
beyond the skb data.

Validate that the remaining skb data contains all advertised handles.
Include this in the existing response validation so malformed responses
also follow the established CIG failure handling.

Fixes: 26afbd826ee3 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laxman Acharya Padhya &lt;acharyalaxman8848@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0acd4eeb4b225b9bebbf9ef96cc10cdd79b94899 upstream.

The Command Complete dispatch validates only the fixed part of the LE Set
CIG Parameters response. After that part is pulled from the skb,
hci_cc_le_set_cig_params() trusts num_handles and reads each entry in the
trailing handle array.

Matching num_handles against the command's num_cis does not guarantee
that the response contains the advertised handles. A truncated response
from a malfunctioning controller can therefore make the handler read
beyond the skb data.

Validate that the remaining skb data contains all advertised handles.
Include this in the existing response validation so malformed responses
also follow the established CIG failure handling.

Fixes: 26afbd826ee3 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laxman Acharya Padhya &lt;acharyalaxman8848@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_event: fix LE list UAF on reset</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chengfeng Ye</name>
<email>nicoyip.dev@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-30T08:32:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0628cc9b2fa29985a7b8c774741f8a736b0f5e7c'/>
<id>0628cc9b2fa29985a7b8c774741f8a736b0f5e7c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 33af47e847fe4a28b109673affb5874015d54f5a upstream.

hci_cc_reset() clears the LE accept and resolving lists without taking
hdev-&gt;lock. Other command-complete handlers serialize updates to these
lists with that lock, and the debugfs readers hold it while walking them.

This permits the reset completion and a debugfs read to interleave as
follows:

  hci_rx_work                 debugfs reader
  -----------                 --------------
                              lock hdev-&gt;lock
                              fetch current entry
  list_del(entry)
  kfree(entry)
                              read entry fields

The reader then dereferences a freed list entry and may follow its stale
next pointer.

KASAN reported:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in white_list_show+0x15f/0x180
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881015dab16 by task poc/95

  Call Trace:
   white_list_show+0x15f/0x180
   seq_read_iter+0x3ff/0x1190
   seq_read+0x267/0x3d0
   vfs_read+0x177/0xa20
   ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0

  Allocated by task 91:
   hci_bdaddr_list_add+0x1a6/0x3a0
   hci_cc_le_add_to_accept_list+0xab/0x140
   hci_cmd_complete_evt+0x26c/0x9a0
   hci_event_packet+0x454/0xb20
   hci_rx_work+0x293/0x730

  Freed by task 90:
   kfree+0x131/0x3c0
   hci_bdaddr_list_clear+0xd8/0x160
   hci_cc_reset+0x28a/0x370
   hci_cmd_complete_evt+0x26c/0x9a0
   hci_event_packet+0x454/0xb20
   hci_rx_work+0x293/0x730

Take hdev-&gt;lock around both list clears. This matches the existing
mutation and traversal locking convention.

Fixes: a4d5504d5c39 ("Bluetooth: Clear LE white list when resetting controller")
Fixes: cfdb0c2d095a ("Bluetooth: Store Resolv list size")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye &lt;nicoyip.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 33af47e847fe4a28b109673affb5874015d54f5a upstream.

hci_cc_reset() clears the LE accept and resolving lists without taking
hdev-&gt;lock. Other command-complete handlers serialize updates to these
lists with that lock, and the debugfs readers hold it while walking them.

This permits the reset completion and a debugfs read to interleave as
follows:

  hci_rx_work                 debugfs reader
  -----------                 --------------
                              lock hdev-&gt;lock
                              fetch current entry
  list_del(entry)
  kfree(entry)
                              read entry fields

The reader then dereferences a freed list entry and may follow its stale
next pointer.

KASAN reported:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in white_list_show+0x15f/0x180
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881015dab16 by task poc/95

  Call Trace:
   white_list_show+0x15f/0x180
   seq_read_iter+0x3ff/0x1190
   seq_read+0x267/0x3d0
   vfs_read+0x177/0xa20
   ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0

  Allocated by task 91:
   hci_bdaddr_list_add+0x1a6/0x3a0
   hci_cc_le_add_to_accept_list+0xab/0x140
   hci_cmd_complete_evt+0x26c/0x9a0
   hci_event_packet+0x454/0xb20
   hci_rx_work+0x293/0x730

  Freed by task 90:
   kfree+0x131/0x3c0
   hci_bdaddr_list_clear+0xd8/0x160
   hci_cc_reset+0x28a/0x370
   hci_cmd_complete_evt+0x26c/0x9a0
   hci_event_packet+0x454/0xb20
   hci_rx_work+0x293/0x730

Take hdev-&gt;lock around both list clears. This matches the existing
mutation and traversal locking convention.

Fixes: a4d5504d5c39 ("Bluetooth: Clear LE white list when resetting controller")
Fixes: cfdb0c2d095a ("Bluetooth: Store Resolv list size")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye &lt;nicoyip.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: hyperv: validate initial device info bounds</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-10T02:28:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=334271d3812ab3197c95b4593bc6745f8d189114'/>
<id>334271d3812ab3197c95b4593bc6745f8d189114</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 934b7778aa7b7c8f6bb073d2a73ba3674885bae0 upstream.

The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor
bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and
wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both
byte ranges.

A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read
past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass
the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject
descriptor lengths that exceed the packet.

Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending
a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report
descriptor length.

Fixes: b95f5bcb811e ("HID: Move the hid-hyperv driver out of staging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 934b7778aa7b7c8f6bb073d2a73ba3674885bae0 upstream.

The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor
bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and
wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both
byte ranges.

A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read
past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass
the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject
descriptor lengths that exceed the packet.

Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending
a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report
descriptor length.

Fixes: b95f5bcb811e ("HID: Move the hid-hyperv driver out of staging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: sensor: custom: Fix use-after-free in enable_sensor</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Haoxiang Li</name>
<email>haoxiang_li2024@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-07T07:15:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2ce90cfc6646a32100feabd7110ae0352aa01167'/>
<id>2ce90cfc6646a32100feabd7110ae0352aa01167</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ad8fb82b04422f49530d2aa2753cc81d1c60102c upstream.

enable_sensor_store() can call set_power_report_state(), which
dereferences sensor_inst-&gt;power_state and sensor_inst-&gt;report_state.
These pointers refer to entries in sensor_inst-&gt;fields.

Create the field attributes before exposing the enable_sensor sysfs
attribute, so enable_sensor cannot be accessed before the state it
depends on has been initialized.

On remove, delete enable_sensor before freeing the field attributes,
so a concurrent sysfs write cannot dereference freed memory through
power_state or report_state.

Reported-by: Sashiko AI Review &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623021950.1736413-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com?part=1
Fixes: 4a7de0519df5 ("HID: sensor: Custom and Generic sensor support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li &lt;haoxiang_li2024@163.com&gt;
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ad8fb82b04422f49530d2aa2753cc81d1c60102c upstream.

enable_sensor_store() can call set_power_report_state(), which
dereferences sensor_inst-&gt;power_state and sensor_inst-&gt;report_state.
These pointers refer to entries in sensor_inst-&gt;fields.

Create the field attributes before exposing the enable_sensor sysfs
attribute, so enable_sensor cannot be accessed before the state it
depends on has been initialized.

On remove, delete enable_sensor before freeing the field attributes,
so a concurrent sysfs write cannot dereference freed memory through
power_state or report_state.

Reported-by: Sashiko AI Review &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623021950.1736413-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com?part=1
Fixes: 4a7de0519df5 ("HID: sensor: Custom and Generic sensor support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li &lt;haoxiang_li2024@163.com&gt;
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: core: fix number/pointer type confusion on long items</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-03T18:30:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=abec577de5fc16cd5caae42f97cdcd0983c06d66'/>
<id>abec577de5fc16cd5caae42f97cdcd0983c06d66</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 28abce951343fcec26e397610868efa4e1395c3f upstream.

When fetch_item() is called by hid_scan_report() on an item with
HID_ITEM_TAG_LONG, it stores a pointer to the item data in
item-&gt;data.longdata instead of storing a value directly in
item-&gt;data.{u8/u16/u32}.

When item_udata() or item_sdata() encounters such an item, it incorrectly
assumes that the item is in short format, and therefore returns the lower
part of a kernel pointer reinterpreted as a number.

When a HID device is connected whose descriptor contains a
HID_GLOBAL_ITEM_TAG_REPORT_SIZE encoded in long format with size=4, this
causes the lower half of a kernel pointer to be printed into dmesg as a
number, like this:

    hid (null): invalid report_size 107953555

To fix it, let item_udata() and item_sdata() verify that the item is in
short format.

Note that this bug only affects hid_scan_report(), while the main parsing
pass hid_parse_collections() will always bail out when encountering a long
item.

Sidenote: There are currently no users of data.longdata; maybe we should
just remove any parsing of long-format descriptors as a follow-up.

Fixes: 3dc8fc083dbf ("HID: Use hid_parser for pre-scanning the report descriptors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 28abce951343fcec26e397610868efa4e1395c3f upstream.

When fetch_item() is called by hid_scan_report() on an item with
HID_ITEM_TAG_LONG, it stores a pointer to the item data in
item-&gt;data.longdata instead of storing a value directly in
item-&gt;data.{u8/u16/u32}.

When item_udata() or item_sdata() encounters such an item, it incorrectly
assumes that the item is in short format, and therefore returns the lower
part of a kernel pointer reinterpreted as a number.

When a HID device is connected whose descriptor contains a
HID_GLOBAL_ITEM_TAG_REPORT_SIZE encoded in long format with size=4, this
causes the lower half of a kernel pointer to be printed into dmesg as a
number, like this:

    hid (null): invalid report_size 107953555

To fix it, let item_udata() and item_sdata() verify that the item is in
short format.

Note that this bug only affects hid_scan_report(), while the main parsing
pass hid_parse_collections() will always bail out when encountering a long
item.

Sidenote: There are currently no users of data.longdata; maybe we should
just remove any parsing of long-format descriptors as a follow-up.

Fixes: 3dc8fc083dbf ("HID: Use hid_parser for pre-scanning the report descriptors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler()</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ibrahim Hashimov</name>
<email>security@auditcode.ai</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-15T11:52:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bd397c4123a4bc084913d8c7fdb40ef94e9f8172'/>
<id>bd397c4123a4bc084913d8c7fdb40ef94e9f8172</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557 upstream.

joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to
struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a
12-byte length check:

	if (size &gt;= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */
		joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);

struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a
union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report()
-&gt; joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48),
so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes
the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The
over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and
forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking
driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a
malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.

Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an
over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded
bytes still reach userspace.

The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the
same cast correctly:

	if (size &lt; sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) ||
	    data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY)
		break;

Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

Fixes: 2af16c1f846b ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Reviewed-by: Silvan Jegen &lt;s.jegen@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557 upstream.

joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to
struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a
12-byte length check:

	if (size &gt;= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */
		joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);

struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a
union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report()
-&gt; joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48),
so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes
the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The
over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and
forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking
driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a
malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.

Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an
over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded
bytes still reach userspace.

The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the
same cast correctly:

	if (size &lt; sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) ||
	    data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY)
		break;

Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

Fixes: 2af16c1f846b ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Reviewed-by: Silvan Jegen &lt;s.jegen@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mptcp: pm: fix memory leak from alloc-during-teardown race</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shardul Bankar</name>
<email>shardul.b@mpiricsoftware.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-25T11:29:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bb32e9a6a9a9f99eeda16c4efe443400f3e43892'/>
<id>bb32e9a6a9a9f99eeda16c4efe443400f3e43892</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit efc33b5102ff859bacd390a5f30112d8e0c084c0 ]

mptcp_pm_destroy() empties msk-&gt;pm.anno_list and
msk-&gt;pm.userspace_pm_local_addr_list under msk-&gt;pm.lock during socket
teardown, dropping the lock between the two.

A concurrent userspace PM genl ANNOUNCE on the same msk holds a sock
reference via mptcp_token_get_sock() and, in
mptcp_pm_nl_announce_doit(), calls
mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr() and
mptcp_pm_announced_alloc(). Both take msk-&gt;pm.lock briefly to add to
their respective lists. Because the genl handler holds a sock reference,
mptcp_pm_destroy() may run on the same msk via mptcp_disconnect(), which
invokes mptcp_destroy_common() without dropping the sock refcount,
before the handler completes.

If the lock acquisitions interleave such that mptcp_pm_destroy() empties
a list first, the later alloc adds its entry to a list head that nothing
else iterates for this msk, and the entry leaks. kmemleak reports both
mptcp_pm_add_addr objects (from mptcp_pm_announced_alloc()) and
mptcp_pm_addr_entry objects (from
mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr()) under sustained concurrent
ANNOUNCE + close load against the userspace PM.

Add an MPTCP_PM_DESTROYING bit in msk-&gt;pm.status, set by
mptcp_pm_destroy() under pm.lock before the lists are emptied and
checked under pm.lock by the alloc paths. Either the alloc takes pm.lock
first, in which case its entry is on the list when mptcp_pm_destroy()
frees it; or mptcp_pm_destroy() takes pm.lock first, in which case the
later alloc observes the bit and refuses.

Found by an MPTCP protocol-flow harness extending BRF (arXiv:2305.08782).

Fixes: 9ab4807c84a4 ("mptcp: netlink: Add MPTCP_PM_CMD_ANNOUNCE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shardul Bankar &lt;shardul.b@mpiricsoftware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) &lt;matttbe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) &lt;matttbe@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-7-2-rc6-v2-6-b8f496d71664@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ Inlined `mptcp_pm_destroy()` at its call site in `mptcp_destroy_common()` and moved the fences into the pre-rename `mptcp_pm_alloc_anno_list()`/`mptcp_free_local_addr_list()` equivalents, deleting the `mptcp_pm_is_userspace()` guard from inside the callee instead of the call site. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit efc33b5102ff859bacd390a5f30112d8e0c084c0 ]

mptcp_pm_destroy() empties msk-&gt;pm.anno_list and
msk-&gt;pm.userspace_pm_local_addr_list under msk-&gt;pm.lock during socket
teardown, dropping the lock between the two.

A concurrent userspace PM genl ANNOUNCE on the same msk holds a sock
reference via mptcp_token_get_sock() and, in
mptcp_pm_nl_announce_doit(), calls
mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr() and
mptcp_pm_announced_alloc(). Both take msk-&gt;pm.lock briefly to add to
their respective lists. Because the genl handler holds a sock reference,
mptcp_pm_destroy() may run on the same msk via mptcp_disconnect(), which
invokes mptcp_destroy_common() without dropping the sock refcount,
before the handler completes.

If the lock acquisitions interleave such that mptcp_pm_destroy() empties
a list first, the later alloc adds its entry to a list head that nothing
else iterates for this msk, and the entry leaks. kmemleak reports both
mptcp_pm_add_addr objects (from mptcp_pm_announced_alloc()) and
mptcp_pm_addr_entry objects (from
mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr()) under sustained concurrent
ANNOUNCE + close load against the userspace PM.

Add an MPTCP_PM_DESTROYING bit in msk-&gt;pm.status, set by
mptcp_pm_destroy() under pm.lock before the lists are emptied and
checked under pm.lock by the alloc paths. Either the alloc takes pm.lock
first, in which case its entry is on the list when mptcp_pm_destroy()
frees it; or mptcp_pm_destroy() takes pm.lock first, in which case the
later alloc observes the bit and refuses.

Found by an MPTCP protocol-flow harness extending BRF (arXiv:2305.08782).

Fixes: 9ab4807c84a4 ("mptcp: netlink: Add MPTCP_PM_CMD_ANNOUNCE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shardul Bankar &lt;shardul.b@mpiricsoftware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) &lt;matttbe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) &lt;matttbe@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-7-2-rc6-v2-6-b8f496d71664@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ Inlined `mptcp_pm_destroy()` at its call site in `mptcp_destroy_common()` and moved the fences into the pre-rename `mptcp_pm_alloc_anno_list()`/`mptcp_free_local_addr_list()` equivalents, deleting the `mptcp_pm_is_userspace()` guard from inside the callee instead of the call site. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR ZQC-P</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Donglin Lyu</name>
<email>DongLin_Lyu@outlook.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-24T15:19:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a5321b00b98ec3c6acb4098ec961945f193dfa4b'/>
<id>a5321b00b98ec3c6acb4098ec961945f193dfa4b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 410c44b1096789d0c40fbee706520e981dba7bc1 ]

The internal keyboard on the HONOR ZQC-P (HONOR MagicBook Pro 14 2026)
does not work after boot.

Using the kernel command line 'i8042.dumbkbd=1' makes the keyboard
functional, but the CapsLock LED does not work. Adding the
'atkbd_deactivate_fixup' quirk fixes the keyboard and CapsLock LED
natively without requiring boot parameters.

DMI: HONOR ZQC-P/ZQC-P-PCB, BIOS 1.09 03/19/2026

Fixes: 9cf6e24c9fbf ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID")
Signed-off-by: Donglin Lyu &lt;donglin_lyu@outlook.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ruslan Shevchenko &lt;adefka@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260801151115.52709-1-donglin_lyu@outlook.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[dtor: keep all HONOR entries together]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 410c44b1096789d0c40fbee706520e981dba7bc1 ]

The internal keyboard on the HONOR ZQC-P (HONOR MagicBook Pro 14 2026)
does not work after boot.

Using the kernel command line 'i8042.dumbkbd=1' makes the keyboard
functional, but the CapsLock LED does not work. Adding the
'atkbd_deactivate_fixup' quirk fixes the keyboard and CapsLock LED
natively without requiring boot parameters.

DMI: HONOR ZQC-P/ZQC-P-PCB, BIOS 1.09 03/19/2026

Fixes: 9cf6e24c9fbf ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID")
Signed-off-by: Donglin Lyu &lt;donglin_lyu@outlook.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ruslan Shevchenko &lt;adefka@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260801151115.52709-1-donglin_lyu@outlook.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[dtor: keep all HONOR entries together]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
