<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git, branch v4.19.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.19.78</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-07T16:57:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=58fce20645303bee01d74144ec00e405be43b1ca'/>
<id>58fce20645303bee01d74144ec00e405be43b1ca</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>9p/cache.c: Fix memory leak in v9fs_cache_session_get_cookie</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bharath Vedartham</name>
<email>linux.bhar@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-22T19:45:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5b0446c8e0a85b97148c070f73e273bc3903af5c'/>
<id>5b0446c8e0a85b97148c070f73e273bc3903af5c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 962a991c5de18452d6c429d99f3039387cf5cbb0 upstream.

v9fs_cache_session_get_cookie assigns a random cachetag to v9ses-&gt;cachetag,
if the cachetag is not assigned previously.

v9fs_random_cachetag allocates memory to v9ses-&gt;cachetag with kmalloc and uses
scnprintf to fill it up with a cachetag.

But if scnprintf fails, v9ses-&gt;cachetag is not freed in the current
code causing a memory leak.

Fix this by freeing v9ses-&gt;cachetag it v9fs_random_cachetag fails.

This was reported by syzbot, the link to the report is below:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f012bdf297a7a4c860c38a88b44fbee43fd9bbf3

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522194519.GA5313@bharath12345-Inspiron-5559
Reported-by: syzbot+3a030a73b6c1e9833815@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Bharath Vedartham &lt;linux.bhar@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet &lt;dominique.martinet@cea.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 962a991c5de18452d6c429d99f3039387cf5cbb0 upstream.

v9fs_cache_session_get_cookie assigns a random cachetag to v9ses-&gt;cachetag,
if the cachetag is not assigned previously.

v9fs_random_cachetag allocates memory to v9ses-&gt;cachetag with kmalloc and uses
scnprintf to fill it up with a cachetag.

But if scnprintf fails, v9ses-&gt;cachetag is not freed in the current
code causing a memory leak.

Fix this by freeing v9ses-&gt;cachetag it v9fs_random_cachetag fails.

This was reported by syzbot, the link to the report is below:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f012bdf297a7a4c860c38a88b44fbee43fd9bbf3

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522194519.GA5313@bharath12345-Inspiron-5559
Reported-by: syzbot+3a030a73b6c1e9833815@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Bharath Vedartham &lt;linux.bhar@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet &lt;dominique.martinet@cea.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kexec: bail out upon SIGKILL when allocating memory.</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-25T23:47:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d85bc11a6894170292773b9d2f9ec56511d35dc4'/>
<id>d85bc11a6894170292773b9d2f9ec56511d35dc4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c3a6aedcd6aae0a32a527e68669f7dd667492d1 upstream.

syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside kexec_load() after
that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1].  It turned out that the reproducer
was trying to allocate 2408MB of memory using kimage_alloc_page() from
kimage_load_normal_segment().  Let's check for SIGKILL before doing memory
allocation.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f5e

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/993c9185-d324-2640-d061-bed2dd18b1f7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7c3a6aedcd6aae0a32a527e68669f7dd667492d1 upstream.

syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside kexec_load() after
that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1].  It turned out that the reproducer
was trying to allocate 2408MB of memory using kimage_alloc_page() from
kimage_load_normal_segment().  Let's check for SIGKILL before doing memory
allocation.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f5e

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/993c9185-d324-2640-d061-bed2dd18b1f7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFC: fix attrs checks in netlink interface</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Konovalov</name>
<email>andreyknvl@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-29T13:35:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c8a65ec0602a78a05c9f33d8dc68d7eafef77f2b'/>
<id>c8a65ec0602a78a05c9f33d8dc68d7eafef77f2b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 18917d51472fe3b126a3a8f756c6b18085eb8130 upstream.

nfc_genl_deactivate_target() relies on the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX
attribute being present, but doesn't check whether it is actually
provided by the user. Same goes for nfc_genl_fw_download() and
NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME.

This patch adds appropriate checks.

Found with syzkaller.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 18917d51472fe3b126a3a8f756c6b18085eb8130 upstream.

nfc_genl_deactivate_target() relies on the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX
attribute being present, but doesn't check whether it is actually
provided by the user. Same goes for nfc_genl_fw_download() and
NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME.

This patch adds appropriate checks.

Found with syzkaller.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-22T05:54:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1b42503211ca46711655b834d797f068b1abe59e'/>
<id>1b42503211ca46711655b834d797f068b1abe59e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream.

inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.

Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream.

inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.

Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack: Don't ignore other bprm-&gt;unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-04T18:44:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ef9744a0218f1fce1d5244b911057b092ad51e39'/>
<id>ef9744a0218f1fce1d5244b911057b092ad51e39</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream.

There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
-&gt;unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):

 - task A: create task B with fork()
 - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
 - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
   conditions
 - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
 - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
 - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
 - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
   destroys the ptrace relationship)

Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm-&gt;unsafe, we reject the execve().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream.

There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
-&gt;unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):

 - task A: create task B with fork()
 - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
 - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
   conditions
 - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
 - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
 - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
 - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
   destroys the ptrace relationship)

Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm-&gt;unsafe, we reject the execve().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>soundwire: fix regmap dependencies and align with other serial links</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pierre-Louis Bossart</name>
<email>pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-18T23:02:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4703593498d3d64aff8fba2e0be40ccac3e58814'/>
<id>4703593498d3d64aff8fba2e0be40ccac3e58814</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8676b3ca4673517650fd509d7fa586aff87b3c28 ]

The existing code has a mixed select/depend usage which makes no sense.

config SOUNDWIRE_BUS
       tristate
       select REGMAP_SOUNDWIRE

config REGMAP_SOUNDWIRE
        tristate
        depends on SOUNDWIRE_BUS

Let's remove one layer of Kconfig definitions and align with the
solutions used by all other serial links.

Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart &lt;pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190718230215.18675-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8676b3ca4673517650fd509d7fa586aff87b3c28 ]

The existing code has a mixed select/depend usage which makes no sense.

config SOUNDWIRE_BUS
       tristate
       select REGMAP_SOUNDWIRE

config REGMAP_SOUNDWIRE
        tristate
        depends on SOUNDWIRE_BUS

Let's remove one layer of Kconfig definitions and align with the
solutions used by all other serial links.

Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart &lt;pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190718230215.18675-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>soundwire: Kconfig: fix help format</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pierre-Louis Bossart</name>
<email>pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-01T15:57:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=322753c78d1d9d33b0476735cd49f3e6bca5586d'/>
<id>322753c78d1d9d33b0476735cd49f3e6bca5586d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9d7cd9d500826a14fc68fb6994db375432866c6a ]

Move to the regular help format, --help-- is no longer recommended.

Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart &lt;pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9d7cd9d500826a14fc68fb6994db375432866c6a ]

Move to the regular help format, --help-- is no longer recommended.

Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart &lt;pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sch_cbq: validate TCA_CBQ_WRROPT to avoid crash</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-27T01:24:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74e2a311a2262d1cf604ce92429eb045e5bee7e4'/>
<id>74e2a311a2262d1cf604ce92429eb045e5bee7e4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e9789c7cc182484fc031fd88097eb14cb26c4596 ]

syzbot reported a crash in cbq_normalize_quanta() caused
by an out of range cl-&gt;priority.

iproute2 enforces this check, but malicious users do not.

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 26447 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:cbq_normalize_quanta.part.0+0x1fd/0x430 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:902
RSP: 0018:ffff8801a5c333b0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000020000003 RBX: 00000000fffffff8 RCX: ffffc9000712f000
RDX: 00000000000043bf RSI: ffffffff83be8962 RDI: 0000000100000018
RBP: ffff8801a5c33420 R08: 000000000000003a R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000002ef
R13: ffff88018da95188 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000015
FS:  00007f37d26b1700(0000) GS:ffff8801dad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004c7cec CR3: 00000001bcd0a006 CR4: 00000000001626f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff83be9d57&gt;] cbq_normalize_quanta include/net/pkt_sched.h:27 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83be9d57&gt;] cbq_addprio net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1097 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83be9d57&gt;] cbq_set_wrr+0x2d7/0x450 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1115
 [&lt;ffffffff83bee8a7&gt;] cbq_change_class+0x987/0x225b net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1537
 [&lt;ffffffff83b96985&gt;] tc_ctl_tclass+0x555/0xcd0 net/sched/sch_api.c:2329
 [&lt;ffffffff83a84655&gt;] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x485/0xc10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5248
 [&lt;ffffffff83cadf0a&gt;] netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2510
 [&lt;ffffffff83a7db6d&gt;] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5266
 [&lt;ffffffff83cac2c6&gt;] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1324 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83cac2c6&gt;] netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1350
 [&lt;ffffffff83cacd4a&gt;] netlink_sendmsg+0x89a/0xd50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1939
 [&lt;ffffffff8399d46e&gt;] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:673 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff8399d46e&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x12e/0x170 net/socket.c:684
 [&lt;ffffffff8399f1fd&gt;] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81d/0x960 net/socket.c:2359
 [&lt;ffffffff839a2d05&gt;] __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2397
 [&lt;ffffffff839a2df9&gt;] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2406 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff839a2df9&gt;] SyS_sendmsg+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:2404
 [&lt;ffffffff8101ccc8&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x528/0x770 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305
 [&lt;ffffffff84400091&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit e9789c7cc182484fc031fd88097eb14cb26c4596 ]

syzbot reported a crash in cbq_normalize_quanta() caused
by an out of range cl-&gt;priority.

iproute2 enforces this check, but malicious users do not.

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 26447 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:cbq_normalize_quanta.part.0+0x1fd/0x430 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:902
RSP: 0018:ffff8801a5c333b0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000020000003 RBX: 00000000fffffff8 RCX: ffffc9000712f000
RDX: 00000000000043bf RSI: ffffffff83be8962 RDI: 0000000100000018
RBP: ffff8801a5c33420 R08: 000000000000003a R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000002ef
R13: ffff88018da95188 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000015
FS:  00007f37d26b1700(0000) GS:ffff8801dad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004c7cec CR3: 00000001bcd0a006 CR4: 00000000001626f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff83be9d57&gt;] cbq_normalize_quanta include/net/pkt_sched.h:27 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83be9d57&gt;] cbq_addprio net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1097 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83be9d57&gt;] cbq_set_wrr+0x2d7/0x450 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1115
 [&lt;ffffffff83bee8a7&gt;] cbq_change_class+0x987/0x225b net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1537
 [&lt;ffffffff83b96985&gt;] tc_ctl_tclass+0x555/0xcd0 net/sched/sch_api.c:2329
 [&lt;ffffffff83a84655&gt;] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x485/0xc10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5248
 [&lt;ffffffff83cadf0a&gt;] netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2510
 [&lt;ffffffff83a7db6d&gt;] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5266
 [&lt;ffffffff83cac2c6&gt;] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1324 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83cac2c6&gt;] netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1350
 [&lt;ffffffff83cacd4a&gt;] netlink_sendmsg+0x89a/0xd50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1939
 [&lt;ffffffff8399d46e&gt;] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:673 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff8399d46e&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x12e/0x170 net/socket.c:684
 [&lt;ffffffff8399f1fd&gt;] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81d/0x960 net/socket.c:2359
 [&lt;ffffffff839a2d05&gt;] __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2397
 [&lt;ffffffff839a2df9&gt;] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2406 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff839a2df9&gt;] SyS_sendmsg+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:2404
 [&lt;ffffffff8101ccc8&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x528/0x770 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305
 [&lt;ffffffff84400091&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>tipc: fix unlimited bundling of small messages</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tuong Lien</name>
<email>tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-02T11:49:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ed9420ddce8711999f1446cd0e05594b54cbdd58'/>
<id>ed9420ddce8711999f1446cd0e05594b54cbdd58</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e95584a889e1902fdf1ded9712e2c3c3083baf96 ]

We have identified a problem with the "oversubscription" policy in the
link transmission code.

When small messages are transmitted, and the sending link has reached
the transmit window limit, those messages will be bundled and put into
the link backlog queue. However, bundles of data messages are counted
at the 'CRITICAL' level, so that the counter for that level, instead of
the counter for the real, bundled message's level is the one being
increased.
Subsequent, to-be-bundled data messages at non-CRITICAL levels continue
to be tested against the unchanged counter for their own level, while
contributing to an unrestrained increase at the CRITICAL backlog level.

This leaves a gap in congestion control algorithm for small messages
that can result in starvation for other users or a "real" CRITICAL
user. Even that eventually can lead to buffer exhaustion &amp; link reset.

We fix this by keeping a 'target_bskb' buffer pointer at each levels,
then when bundling, we only bundle messages at the same importance
level only. This way, we know exactly how many slots a certain level
have occupied in the queue, so can manage level congestion accurately.

By bundling messages at the same level, we even have more benefits. Let
consider this:
- One socket sends 64-byte messages at the 'CRITICAL' level;
- Another sends 4096-byte messages at the 'LOW' level;

When a 64-byte message comes and is bundled the first time, we put the
overhead of message bundle to it (+ 40-byte header, data copy, etc.)
for later use, but the next message can be a 4096-byte one that cannot
be bundled to the previous one. This means the last bundle carries only
one payload message which is totally inefficient, as for the receiver
also! Later on, another 64-byte message comes, now we make a new bundle
and the same story repeats...

With the new bundling algorithm, this will not happen, the 64-byte
messages will be bundled together even when the 4096-byte message(s)
comes in between. However, if the 4096-byte messages are sent at the
same level i.e. 'CRITICAL', the bundling algorithm will again cause the
same overhead.

Also, the same will happen even with only one socket sending small
messages at a rate close to the link transmit's one, so that, when one
message is bundled, it's transmitted shortly. Then, another message
comes, a new bundle is created and so on...

We will solve this issue radically by another patch.

Fixes: 365ad353c256 ("tipc: reduce risk of user starvation during link congestion")
Reported-by: Hoang Le &lt;hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au&gt;
Acked-by: Jon Maloy &lt;jon.maloy@ericsson.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien &lt;tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e95584a889e1902fdf1ded9712e2c3c3083baf96 ]

We have identified a problem with the "oversubscription" policy in the
link transmission code.

When small messages are transmitted, and the sending link has reached
the transmit window limit, those messages will be bundled and put into
the link backlog queue. However, bundles of data messages are counted
at the 'CRITICAL' level, so that the counter for that level, instead of
the counter for the real, bundled message's level is the one being
increased.
Subsequent, to-be-bundled data messages at non-CRITICAL levels continue
to be tested against the unchanged counter for their own level, while
contributing to an unrestrained increase at the CRITICAL backlog level.

This leaves a gap in congestion control algorithm for small messages
that can result in starvation for other users or a "real" CRITICAL
user. Even that eventually can lead to buffer exhaustion &amp; link reset.

We fix this by keeping a 'target_bskb' buffer pointer at each levels,
then when bundling, we only bundle messages at the same importance
level only. This way, we know exactly how many slots a certain level
have occupied in the queue, so can manage level congestion accurately.

By bundling messages at the same level, we even have more benefits. Let
consider this:
- One socket sends 64-byte messages at the 'CRITICAL' level;
- Another sends 4096-byte messages at the 'LOW' level;

When a 64-byte message comes and is bundled the first time, we put the
overhead of message bundle to it (+ 40-byte header, data copy, etc.)
for later use, but the next message can be a 4096-byte one that cannot
be bundled to the previous one. This means the last bundle carries only
one payload message which is totally inefficient, as for the receiver
also! Later on, another 64-byte message comes, now we make a new bundle
and the same story repeats...

With the new bundling algorithm, this will not happen, the 64-byte
messages will be bundled together even when the 4096-byte message(s)
comes in between. However, if the 4096-byte messages are sent at the
same level i.e. 'CRITICAL', the bundling algorithm will again cause the
same overhead.

Also, the same will happen even with only one socket sending small
messages at a rate close to the link transmit's one, so that, when one
message is bundled, it's transmitted shortly. Then, another message
comes, a new bundle is created and so on...

We will solve this issue radically by another patch.

Fixes: 365ad353c256 ("tipc: reduce risk of user starvation during link congestion")
Reported-by: Hoang Le &lt;hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au&gt;
Acked-by: Jon Maloy &lt;jon.maloy@ericsson.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien &lt;tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
