linux-stable.git, branch v3.4.29 Linux kernel stable tree Linux 3.4.29 2013-02-04T00:24:52+00:00 Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org 2013-02-04T00:24:52+00:00 398cc33fbceda864a91433b2a76bb510a640021a 






target: fix regression with dev_link_magic in target_fabric_port_link
2013-02-04T00:24:42+00:00

Nicholas Bellinger
nab@linux-iscsi.org

2013-01-25T02:57:14+00:00

9767a2421ad0f125bda9a8a1bed0c76bece8125c

This is to fix a regression that only affect the stable (not for the mainline)
that the stable commit fdf9d86 was incorrectly placed dev->dev_link_magic check
before the *dev assignment in target_fabric_port_link() due to fuzzy automatically
context adjustment during the back-porting.

Reported-by: Chris Boot <bootc@bootc.net>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






This is to fix a regression that only affect the stable (not for the mainline)
that the stable commit fdf9d86 was incorrectly placed dev->dev_link_magic check
before the *dev assignment in target_fabric_port_link() due to fuzzy automatically
context adjustment during the back-porting.

Reported-by: Chris Boot <bootc@bootc.net>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








x86/Sandy Bridge: Sandy Bridge workaround depends on CONFIG_PCI
2013-02-04T00:24:42+00:00

H. Peter Anvin
hpa@linux.intel.com

2013-01-14T04:56:41+00:00

ae2bac5c25d3f073d307338d9a84a1fe454c283b

commit e43b3cec711a61edf047adf6204d542f3a659ef8 upstream.

early_pci_allowed() and read_pci_config_16() are only available if
CONFIG_PCI is defined.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Signed-off-by: Abdallah Chatila <abdallah.chatila@ericsson.com>






commit e43b3cec711a61edf047adf6204d542f3a659ef8 upstream.

early_pci_allowed() and read_pci_config_16() are only available if
CONFIG_PCI is defined.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Signed-off-by: Abdallah Chatila <abdallah.chatila@ericsson.com>








x86, efi: Set runtime_version to the EFI spec revision
2013-02-04T00:24:42+00:00

Matt Fleming
matt.fleming@intel.com

2013-01-25T10:07:25+00:00

40913e0adeb733053017293b0a5d6e096e47e4a1

commit 712ba9e9afc4b3d3d6fa81565ca36fe518915c01 upstream.

efi.runtime_version is erroneously being set to the value of the
vendor's firmware revision instead of that of the implemented EFI
specification. We can't deduce which EFI functions are available based
on the revision of the vendor's firmware since the version scheme is
likely to be unique to each vendor.

What we really need to know is the revision of the implemented EFI
specification, which is available in the EFI System Table header.

Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 712ba9e9afc4b3d3d6fa81565ca36fe518915c01 upstream.

efi.runtime_version is erroneously being set to the value of the
vendor's firmware revision instead of that of the implemented EFI
specification. We can't deduce which EFI functions are available based
on the revision of the vendor's firmware since the version scheme is
likely to be unique to each vendor.

What we really need to know is the revision of the implemented EFI
specification, which is available in the EFI System Table header.

Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog
2013-02-04T00:24:42+00:00

Nathan Zimmer
nzimmer@sgi.com

2013-01-08T15:02:43+00:00

956b0310a4f4cb0777d1e8a11a23950ec111a13b

commit b8f2c21db390273c3eaf0e5308faeaeb1e233840 upstream.

Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available
memory.  This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in
which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping.

The result is a crash that looks much like this.

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020
IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU 0
Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W    3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform
RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>]  [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28  EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000
RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030
R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400)
Stack:
 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff
 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400
 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83
 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed
 [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80
 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305
 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2
 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60
 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1
 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120
 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163
Code:  Bad RIP value.
RIP  [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
 RSP <ffffffff81601d28>
CR2: 000000effd870020
---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]---

Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit b8f2c21db390273c3eaf0e5308faeaeb1e233840 upstream.

Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available
memory.  This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in
which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping.

The result is a crash that looks much like this.

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020
IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU 0
Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W    3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform
RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>]  [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28  EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000
RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030
R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400)
Stack:
 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff
 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400
 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83
 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed
 [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80
 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305
 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2
 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60
 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1
 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120
 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163
Code:  Bad RIP value.
RIP  [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
 RSP <ffffffff81601d28>
CR2: 000000effd870020
---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]---

Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








x86/msr: Add capabilities check
2013-02-04T00:24:42+00:00

Alan Cox
alan@linux.intel.com

2012-11-15T13:06:22+00:00

4031dfce34e8e8355c649f950a9ec7ccad20beee

commit c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00 upstream.

At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system
checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set
can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but
on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them
provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space.
Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and
MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already.

In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device
file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of
some capability and security model based systems down towards
that of a generic "root owns the box" setup.

Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an
elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal
on most setups because they don't have heavy use of
capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might
want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be
tighter.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00 upstream.

At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system
checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set
can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but
on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them
provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space.
Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and
MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already.

In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device
file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of
some capability and security model based systems down towards
that of a generic "root owns the box" setup.

Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an
elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal
on most setups because they don't have heavy use of
capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might
want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be
tighter.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








smp: Fix SMP function call empty cpu mask race
2013-02-04T00:24:42+00:00

Wang YanQing
udknight@gmail.com

2013-01-26T07:53:57+00:00

846c314fd6124b5bd3a3db2624818f29616874a1

commit f44310b98ddb7f0d06550d73ed67df5865e3eda5 upstream.

I get the following warning every day with v3.7, once or
twice a day:

  [ 2235.186027] WARNING: at /mnt/sda7/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kernel/apic/ipi.c:109 default_send_IPI_mask_logical+0x2f/0xb8()

As explained by Linus as well:

 |
 | Once we've done the "list_add_rcu()" to add it to the
 | queue, we can have (another) IPI to the target CPU that can
 | now see it and clear the mask.
 |
 | So by the time we get to actually send the IPI, the mask might
 | have been cleared by another IPI.
 |

This patch also fixes a system hang problem, if the data->cpumask
gets cleared after passing this point:

        if (WARN_ONCE(!mask, "empty IPI mask"))
                return;

then the problem in commit 83d349f35e1a ("x86: don't send an IPI to
the empty set of CPU's") will happen again.

Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: mina86@mina86.org
Cc: srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130126075357.GA3205@udknight
[ Tidied up the changelog and the comment in the code. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit f44310b98ddb7f0d06550d73ed67df5865e3eda5 upstream.

I get the following warning every day with v3.7, once or
twice a day:

  [ 2235.186027] WARNING: at /mnt/sda7/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kernel/apic/ipi.c:109 default_send_IPI_mask_logical+0x2f/0xb8()

As explained by Linus as well:

 |
 | Once we've done the "list_add_rcu()" to add it to the
 | queue, we can have (another) IPI to the target CPU that can
 | now see it and clear the mask.
 |
 | So by the time we get to actually send the IPI, the mask might
 | have been cleared by another IPI.
 |

This patch also fixes a system hang problem, if the data->cpumask
gets cleared after passing this point:

        if (WARN_ONCE(!mask, "empty IPI mask"))
                return;

then the problem in commit 83d349f35e1a ("x86: don't send an IPI to
the empty set of CPU's") will happen again.

Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: mina86@mina86.org
Cc: srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130126075357.GA3205@udknight
[ Tidied up the changelog and the comment in the code. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








NFS: Don't silently fail setattr() requests on mountpoints
2013-02-04T00:24:42+00:00

Trond Myklebust
Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com

2013-01-22T05:17:06+00:00

64fdede97a7c38889dd9b9016aac3e2afc23412b

commit ab225417825963b6dc66be7ea80f94ac1378dfdf upstream.

Ensure that any setattr and getattr requests for junctions and/or
mountpoints are sent to the server. Ever since commit
0ec26fd0698 (vfs: automount should ignore LOOKUP_FOLLOW), we have
silently dropped any setattr requests to a server-side mountpoint.
For referrals, we have silently dropped both getattr and setattr
requests.

This patch restores the original behaviour for setattr on mountpoints,
and tries to do the same for referrals, provided that we have a
filehandle...

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit ab225417825963b6dc66be7ea80f94ac1378dfdf upstream.

Ensure that any setattr and getattr requests for junctions and/or
mountpoints are sent to the server. Ever since commit
0ec26fd0698 (vfs: automount should ignore LOOKUP_FOLLOW), we have
silently dropped any setattr requests to a server-side mountpoint.
For referrals, we have silently dropped both getattr and setattr
requests.

This patch restores the original behaviour for setattr on mountpoints,
and tries to do the same for referrals, provided that we have a
filehandle...

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








mac80211: synchronize scan off/on-channel and PS states
2013-02-04T00:24:42+00:00

Stanislaw Gruszka
sgruszka@redhat.com

2012-12-20T13:41:18+00:00

5a099d740ffdff7b217f23d7d871c4fb0c24a24b

commit aacde9ee45225f7e0b90960f479aef83c66bfdc0 upstream.

Since:

commit b23b025fe246f3acc2988eb6d400df34c27cb8ae
Author: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Date:   Fri Feb 4 11:54:17 2011 -0800

    mac80211: Optimize scans on current operating channel.

we do not disable PS while going back to operational channel (on
ieee80211_scan_state_suspend) and deffer that until scan finish.
But since we are allowed to send frames, we can send a frame to AP
without PM bit set, so disable PS on AP side. Then when we switch
to off-channel (in ieee80211_scan_state_resume) we do not enable PS.
Hence we are off-channel with PS disabled, frames are not buffered
by AP.

To fix remove offchannel_ps_disable argument and always enable PS when
going off-channel and disable it when going on-channel, like it was
before.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.39+
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>





commit aacde9ee45225f7e0b90960f479aef83c66bfdc0 upstream.

Since:

commit b23b025fe246f3acc2988eb6d400df34c27cb8ae
Author: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Date:   Fri Feb 4 11:54:17 2011 -0800

    mac80211: Optimize scans on current operating channel.

we do not disable PS while going back to operational channel (on
ieee80211_scan_state_suspend) and deffer that until scan finish.
But since we are allowed to send frames, we can send a frame to AP
without PM bit set, so disable PS on AP side. Then when we switch
to off-channel (in ieee80211_scan_state_resume) we do not enable PS.
Hence we are off-channel with PS disabled, frames are not buffered
by AP.

To fix remove offchannel_ps_disable argument and always enable PS when
going off-channel and disable it when going on-channel, like it was
before.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.39+
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>







iommu/intel: disable DMAR for g4x integrated gfx
2013-02-04T00:24:41+00:00

Daniel Vetter
daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch

2013-01-20T22:50:13+00:00

4b56ffb0c322d955c7fe6bae60711479b7ef6519

commit 9452618e7462181ed9755236803b6719298a13ce upstream.

DMAR support on g4x/gm45 integrated gpus seems to be totally busted.
So don't bother, but instead disable it by default to allow distros to
unconditionally enable DMAR support.

v2: Actually wire up the right quirk entry, spotted by Adam Jackson.

Note that according to intel marketing materials only g45 and gm45
support DMAR/VT-d. So we have reports for all relevant gen4 pci ids by
now. Still, keep all the other gen4 ids in the quirk table in case the
marketing stuff confused me again, which would not be the first time.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=51921
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=538163
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=538163
Cc: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Tested-by: stathis <stathis@npcglib.org>
Tested-by: Mihai Moldovan <ionic@ionic.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Mihai Moldovan <ionic@ionic.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 9452618e7462181ed9755236803b6719298a13ce upstream.

DMAR support on g4x/gm45 integrated gpus seems to be totally busted.
So don't bother, but instead disable it by default to allow distros to
unconditionally enable DMAR support.

v2: Actually wire up the right quirk entry, spotted by Adam Jackson.

Note that according to intel marketing materials only g45 and gm45
support DMAR/VT-d. So we have reports for all relevant gen4 pci ids by
now. Still, keep all the other gen4 ids in the quirk table in case the
marketing stuff confused me again, which would not be the first time.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=51921
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=538163
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=538163
Cc: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Tested-by: stathis <stathis@npcglib.org>
Tested-by: Mihai Moldovan <ionic@ionic.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Mihai Moldovan <ionic@ionic.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>