<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git, branch v3.2.88</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 3.2.88</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:18:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-04T21:18:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ac11752c47b979ab5119806643aa67bcaa2641b9'/>
<id>ac11752c47b979ab5119806643aa67bcaa2641b9</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Guard against null match function in keyring_search_aux()</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:18:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-01T03:55:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e2b41f761b086da2ec43b1cfea14ca0681cd08b0'/>
<id>e2b41f761b086da2ec43b1cfea14ca0681cd08b0</id>
<content type='text'>
The "dead" key type has no match operation, and a search for keys of
this type can cause a null dereference in keyring_search_aux().
keyring_search() has a check for this, but request_keyring_and_link()
does not.  Move the check into keyring_search_aux(), covering both of
them.

This was fixed upstream by commit c06cfb08b88d ("KEYS: Remove
key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse"),
part of a series of large changes that are not suitable for
backporting.

CVE-2017-2647 / CVE-2017-6951

Reported-by: Igor Redko &lt;redkoi@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2017-2647
Reported-by: idl3r &lt;idler1984@gmail.com&gt;
References: https://www.spinics.net/lists/keyrings/msg01845.html
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The "dead" key type has no match operation, and a search for keys of
this type can cause a null dereference in keyring_search_aux().
keyring_search() has a check for this, but request_keyring_and_link()
does not.  Move the check into keyring_search_aux(), covering both of
them.

This was fixed upstream by commit c06cfb08b88d ("KEYS: Remove
key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse"),
part of a series of large changes that are not suitable for
backporting.

CVE-2017-2647 / CVE-2017-6951

Reported-by: Igor Redko &lt;redkoi@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2017-2647
Reported-by: idl3r &lt;idler1984@gmail.com&gt;
References: https://www.spinics.net/lists/keyrings/msg01845.html
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:18:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guillaume Nault</name>
<email>g.nault@alphalink.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-18T21:13:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2147a17048314f069838aace1d08b8c719448b50'/>
<id>2147a17048314f069838aace1d08b8c719448b50</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32c231164b762dddefa13af5a0101032c70b50ef upstream.

Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
 ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
 ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff829f835b&gt;] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff8174d3cc&gt;] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
 [&lt;ffffffff8174d666&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
 [&lt;ffffffff8174db7e&gt;] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
 [&lt;ffffffff8579047e&gt;] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
 [&lt;ffffffff850b2dfd&gt;] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [&lt;ffffffff851dc5a0&gt;] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [&lt;ffffffff84c4581d&gt;] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [&lt;ffffffff84c45976&gt;] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [&lt;ffffffff817a108c&gt;] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [&lt;ffffffff817a1605&gt;] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [&lt;ffffffff813774f9&gt;] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [&lt;ffffffff81324aae&gt;] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [&lt;ffffffff81326dc8&gt;] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [&lt;ffffffff81348cf7&gt;] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [&lt;ffffffff811b49af&gt;] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [&lt;ffffffff810039bf&gt;] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [&lt;ffffffff81006060&gt;] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [&lt;ffffffff85e4d726&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811ddcb6&gt;] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c736&gt;] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c9ad&gt;] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174cee2&gt;] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817476a8&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4f6a9&gt;] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c58ac8&gt;] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff851ddf67&gt;] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4af7b&gt;] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4b46f&gt;] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff85e4d685&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811ddcb6&gt;] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c736&gt;] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174cf61&gt;] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81748b28&gt;] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c541eb&gt;] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5aca4&gt;] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5ad33&gt;] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5af23&gt;] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5cb6c&gt;] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8579044e&gt;] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff850b2dfd&gt;] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff851dc5a0&gt;] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4581d&gt;] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c45976&gt;] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817a108c&gt;] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817a1605&gt;] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff813774f9&gt;] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81324aae&gt;] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81326dc8&gt;] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81348cf7&gt;] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811b49af&gt;] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff810039bf&gt;] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81006060&gt;] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff85e4d726&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                    ^
 ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

==================================================================

The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.

Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;g.nault@alphalink.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop IPv6 changes]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 32c231164b762dddefa13af5a0101032c70b50ef upstream.

Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
 ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
 ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff829f835b&gt;] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff8174d3cc&gt;] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
 [&lt;ffffffff8174d666&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
 [&lt;ffffffff8174db7e&gt;] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
 [&lt;ffffffff8579047e&gt;] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
 [&lt;ffffffff850b2dfd&gt;] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [&lt;ffffffff851dc5a0&gt;] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [&lt;ffffffff84c4581d&gt;] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [&lt;ffffffff84c45976&gt;] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [&lt;ffffffff817a108c&gt;] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [&lt;ffffffff817a1605&gt;] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [&lt;ffffffff813774f9&gt;] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [&lt;ffffffff81324aae&gt;] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [&lt;ffffffff81326dc8&gt;] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [&lt;ffffffff81348cf7&gt;] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [&lt;ffffffff811b49af&gt;] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [&lt;ffffffff810039bf&gt;] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [&lt;ffffffff81006060&gt;] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [&lt;ffffffff85e4d726&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811ddcb6&gt;] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c736&gt;] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c9ad&gt;] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174cee2&gt;] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817476a8&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4f6a9&gt;] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c58ac8&gt;] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff851ddf67&gt;] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4af7b&gt;] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4b46f&gt;] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff85e4d685&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811ddcb6&gt;] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c736&gt;] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174cf61&gt;] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81748b28&gt;] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c541eb&gt;] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5aca4&gt;] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5ad33&gt;] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5af23&gt;] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5cb6c&gt;] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8579044e&gt;] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff850b2dfd&gt;] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff851dc5a0&gt;] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4581d&gt;] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c45976&gt;] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817a108c&gt;] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817a1605&gt;] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff813774f9&gt;] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81324aae&gt;] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81326dc8&gt;] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81348cf7&gt;] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811b49af&gt;] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff810039bf&gt;] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81006060&gt;] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff85e4d726&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                    ^
 ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

==================================================================

The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.

Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;g.nault@alphalink.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop IPv6 changes]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/huge_memory.c: fix up "mm/huge_memory.c: respect FOLL_FORCE/FOLL_COW for thp" backport</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:18:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Hocko</name>
<email>mhocko@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-28T13:17:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2ea6895123eb8604c1c0c153e2fcd1305fb96aca'/>
<id>2ea6895123eb8604c1c0c153e2fcd1305fb96aca</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a stable follow up fix for an incorrect backport. The issue is
not present in the upstream kernel.

Miroslav has noticed the following splat when testing my 3.2 forward
port of 8310d48b125d ("mm/huge_memory.c: respect FOLL_FORCE/FOLL_COW for
thp") to 3.12:

BUG: Bad page state in process a.out  pfn:26400
page:ffffea000085e000 count:0 mapcount:1 mapping:          (null) index:0x7f049d600
page flags: 0x1fffff80108018(uptodate|dirty|head|swapbacked)
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
[iii]
CPU: 2 PID: 5926 Comm: a.out Tainted: G            E    3.12.61-0-default #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 0000000000000000 ffffffff81515830 ffffea000085e000 ffffffff81800ad7
 ffffffff815118a5 ffffea000085e000 0000000000000000 000fffff80000000
 ffffffff81140f18 fff000007c000000 ffffea000085e000 0000000000000009
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff8100475d&gt;] dump_trace+0x7d/0x2d0
 [&lt;ffffffff81004a44&gt;] show_stack_log_lvl+0x94/0x170
 [&lt;ffffffff81005ce1&gt;] show_stack+0x21/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff81515830&gt;] dump_stack+0x5d/0x78
 [&lt;ffffffff815118a5&gt;] bad_page.part.67+0xe8/0x102
 [&lt;ffffffff81140f18&gt;] free_pages_prepare+0x198/0x1b0
 [&lt;ffffffff81141275&gt;] __free_pages_ok+0x15/0xd0
 [&lt;ffffffff8116444c&gt;] __access_remote_vm+0x7c/0x1e0
 [&lt;ffffffff81205afb&gt;] mem_rw.isra.13+0x14b/0x1a0
 [&lt;ffffffff811a3b18&gt;] vfs_write+0xb8/0x1e0
 [&lt;ffffffff811a469b&gt;] SyS_pwrite64+0x6b/0xa0
 [&lt;ffffffff81523b49&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
 [&lt;00007f049da18573&gt;] 0x7f049da18572

The problem is that the original 3.2 backport didn't return NULL page on
the FOLL_COW page and so the page got reused.

Reported-and-tested-by: Miroslav Beneš &lt;mbenes@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is a stable follow up fix for an incorrect backport. The issue is
not present in the upstream kernel.

Miroslav has noticed the following splat when testing my 3.2 forward
port of 8310d48b125d ("mm/huge_memory.c: respect FOLL_FORCE/FOLL_COW for
thp") to 3.12:

BUG: Bad page state in process a.out  pfn:26400
page:ffffea000085e000 count:0 mapcount:1 mapping:          (null) index:0x7f049d600
page flags: 0x1fffff80108018(uptodate|dirty|head|swapbacked)
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
[iii]
CPU: 2 PID: 5926 Comm: a.out Tainted: G            E    3.12.61-0-default #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 0000000000000000 ffffffff81515830 ffffea000085e000 ffffffff81800ad7
 ffffffff815118a5 ffffea000085e000 0000000000000000 000fffff80000000
 ffffffff81140f18 fff000007c000000 ffffea000085e000 0000000000000009
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff8100475d&gt;] dump_trace+0x7d/0x2d0
 [&lt;ffffffff81004a44&gt;] show_stack_log_lvl+0x94/0x170
 [&lt;ffffffff81005ce1&gt;] show_stack+0x21/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff81515830&gt;] dump_stack+0x5d/0x78
 [&lt;ffffffff815118a5&gt;] bad_page.part.67+0xe8/0x102
 [&lt;ffffffff81140f18&gt;] free_pages_prepare+0x198/0x1b0
 [&lt;ffffffff81141275&gt;] __free_pages_ok+0x15/0xd0
 [&lt;ffffffff8116444c&gt;] __access_remote_vm+0x7c/0x1e0
 [&lt;ffffffff81205afb&gt;] mem_rw.isra.13+0x14b/0x1a0
 [&lt;ffffffff811a3b18&gt;] vfs_write+0xb8/0x1e0
 [&lt;ffffffff811a469b&gt;] SyS_pwrite64+0x6b/0xa0
 [&lt;ffffffff81523b49&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
 [&lt;00007f049da18573&gt;] 0x7f049da18572

The problem is that the original 3.2 backport didn't return NULL page on
the FOLL_COW page and so the page got reused.

Reported-and-tested-by: Miroslav Beneš &lt;mbenes@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: keep skb-&gt;dst around in presence of IP options</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:18:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-21T04:23:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6892986c7db05c281322f1f8870f5a46d4080e99'/>
<id>6892986c7db05c281322f1f8870f5a46d4080e99</id>
<content type='text'>
Upstream commit 34b2cef20f19c87999fff3da4071e66937db9644
("ipv4: keep skb-&gt;dst around in presence of IP options") incorrectly
root caused commit d826eb14ecef ("ipv4: PKTINFO doesnt need dst
reference") as bug origin.

This patch should fix the issue for 3.2.xx stable kernels, since IPv4
options seem to get more traction these days, after years of oblivion ;)

Fixes: f84af32cbca70 ("net: ip_queue_rcv_skb() helper"))
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Anarcheuz Fritz &lt;anarcheuz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Upstream commit 34b2cef20f19c87999fff3da4071e66937db9644
("ipv4: keep skb-&gt;dst around in presence of IP options") incorrectly
root caused commit d826eb14ecef ("ipv4: PKTINFO doesnt need dst
reference") as bug origin.

This patch should fix the issue for 3.2.xx stable kernels, since IPv4
options seem to get more traction these days, after years of oblivion ;)

Fixes: f84af32cbca70 ("net: ip_queue_rcv_skb() helper"))
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Anarcheuz Fritz &lt;anarcheuz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 3.2.87</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:19:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-16T02:19:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a5d34b6e04704131e0437a8ef995ed716b75b9a0'/>
<id>a5d34b6e04704131e0437a8ef995ed716b75b9a0</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: n_hdlc: get rid of racy n_hdlc.tbuf</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:18:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Popov</name>
<email>alex.popov@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-28T16:54:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d7ac6cf6751a0ffa00f9e46022024f79b0daa771'/>
<id>d7ac6cf6751a0ffa00f9e46022024f79b0daa771</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 82f2341c94d270421f383641b7cd670e474db56b upstream.

Currently N_HDLC line discipline uses a self-made singly linked list for
data buffers and has n_hdlc.tbuf pointer for buffer retransmitting after
an error.

The commit be10eb7589337e5defbe214dae038a53dd21add8
("tty: n_hdlc add buffer flushing") introduced racy access to n_hdlc.tbuf.
After tx error concurrent flush_tx_queue() and n_hdlc_send_frames() can put
one data buffer to tx_free_buf_list twice. That causes double free in
n_hdlc_release().

Let's use standard kernel linked list and get rid of n_hdlc.tbuf:
in case of tx error put current data buffer after the head of tx_buf_list.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 82f2341c94d270421f383641b7cd670e474db56b upstream.

Currently N_HDLC line discipline uses a self-made singly linked list for
data buffers and has n_hdlc.tbuf pointer for buffer retransmitting after
an error.

The commit be10eb7589337e5defbe214dae038a53dd21add8
("tty: n_hdlc add buffer flushing") introduced racy access to n_hdlc.tbuf.
After tx error concurrent flush_tx_queue() and n_hdlc_send_frames() can put
one data buffer to tx_free_buf_list twice. That causes double free in
n_hdlc_release().

Let's use standard kernel linked list and get rid of n_hdlc.tbuf:
in case of tx error put current data buffer after the head of tx_buf_list.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>list: introduce list_first_entry_or_null</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:18:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Pirko</name>
<email>jiri@resnulli.us</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-29T05:02:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4157e287632c9f88ea9bee74d7296a20aa1654cc'/>
<id>4157e287632c9f88ea9bee74d7296a20aa1654cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6d7581e62f8be462440d7b22c6361f7c9fa4902b upstream.

non-rcu variant of list_first_or_null_rcu

Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6d7581e62f8be462440d7b22c6361f7c9fa4902b upstream.

non-rcu variant of list_first_or_null_rcu

Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TTY: n_hdlc, fix lockdep false positive</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:18:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-26T18:28:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bbaa1c66dda93748aca828bb7bffc7170d777427'/>
<id>bbaa1c66dda93748aca828bb7bffc7170d777427</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9b736d88af1a143530565929390cadf036dc799 upstream.

The class of 4 n_hdls buf locks is the same because a single function
n_hdlc_buf_list_init is used to init all the locks. But since
flush_tx_queue takes n_hdlc-&gt;tx_buf_list.spinlock and then calls
n_hdlc_buf_put which takes n_hdlc-&gt;tx_free_buf_list.spinlock, lockdep
emits a warning:
=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
4.3.0-25.g91e30a7-default #1 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------
a.out/1248 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock){......}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa01fd020&gt;] n_hdlc_buf_put+0x20/0x60 [n_hdlc]

but task is already holding lock:
 (&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock){......}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa01fdc07&gt;] n_hdlc_tty_ioctl+0x127/0x1d0 [n_hdlc]

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock);
  lock(&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

2 locks held by a.out/1248:
 #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++++}, at: [&lt;ffffffff814c9eb0&gt;] tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x20/0x50
 #1:  (&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock){......}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa01fdc07&gt;] n_hdlc_tty_ioctl+0x127/0x1d0 [n_hdlc]
...
Call Trace:
...
 [&lt;ffffffff81738fd0&gt;] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffffa01fd020&gt;] n_hdlc_buf_put+0x20/0x60 [n_hdlc]
 [&lt;ffffffffa01fdc24&gt;] n_hdlc_tty_ioctl+0x144/0x1d0 [n_hdlc]
 [&lt;ffffffff814c25c1&gt;] tty_ioctl+0x3f1/0xe40
...

Fix it by initializing the spin_locks separately. This removes also
reduntand memset of a freshly kzallocated space.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e9b736d88af1a143530565929390cadf036dc799 upstream.

The class of 4 n_hdls buf locks is the same because a single function
n_hdlc_buf_list_init is used to init all the locks. But since
flush_tx_queue takes n_hdlc-&gt;tx_buf_list.spinlock and then calls
n_hdlc_buf_put which takes n_hdlc-&gt;tx_free_buf_list.spinlock, lockdep
emits a warning:
=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
4.3.0-25.g91e30a7-default #1 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------
a.out/1248 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock){......}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa01fd020&gt;] n_hdlc_buf_put+0x20/0x60 [n_hdlc]

but task is already holding lock:
 (&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock){......}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa01fdc07&gt;] n_hdlc_tty_ioctl+0x127/0x1d0 [n_hdlc]

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock);
  lock(&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

2 locks held by a.out/1248:
 #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++++}, at: [&lt;ffffffff814c9eb0&gt;] tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x20/0x50
 #1:  (&amp;(&amp;list-&gt;spinlock)-&gt;rlock){......}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa01fdc07&gt;] n_hdlc_tty_ioctl+0x127/0x1d0 [n_hdlc]
...
Call Trace:
...
 [&lt;ffffffff81738fd0&gt;] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffffa01fd020&gt;] n_hdlc_buf_put+0x20/0x60 [n_hdlc]
 [&lt;ffffffffa01fdc24&gt;] n_hdlc_tty_ioctl+0x144/0x1d0 [n_hdlc]
 [&lt;ffffffff814c25c1&gt;] tty_ioctl+0x3f1/0xe40
...

Fix it by initializing the spin_locks separately. This removes also
reduntand memset of a freshly kzallocated space.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:18:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Ricardo Leitner</name>
<email>marcelo.leitner@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-23T12:31:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6c24f53714319676adf7ab0d2d081e4b9de35bad'/>
<id>6c24f53714319676adf7ab0d2d081e4b9de35bad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dfcb9f4f99f1e9a49e43398a7bfbf56927544af1 upstream.

commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.

As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.

Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.

This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).

Joint work with Xin Long.

Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dfcb9f4f99f1e9a49e43398a7bfbf56927544af1 upstream.

commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.

As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.

Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.

This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).

Joint work with Xin Long.

Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
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