<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git, branch linux-rolling-stable</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge v6.19.13</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c15712c3602826e862340f34eba342d2d98fe697'/>
<id>c15712c3602826e862340f34eba342d2d98fe697</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 6.19.13</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c37bbb1b5317a6418ed353be26a3a12feca6f9c5'/>
<id>c37bbb1b5317a6418ed353be26a3a12feca6f9c5</id>
<content type='text'>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260413155731.568515178@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Ronald Warsow &lt;rwarsow@gmx.de&gt;
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield &lt;bacs@librecast.net&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;florian.fainelli@broadcom.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara &lt;takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Peter Schneider &lt;pschneider1968@googlemail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan &lt;barryn@pobox.com&gt;
Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dileep Malepu &lt;dileep.debian@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260413155731.568515178@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Ronald Warsow &lt;rwarsow@gmx.de&gt;
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield &lt;bacs@librecast.net&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;florian.fainelli@broadcom.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara &lt;takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Peter Schneider &lt;pschneider1968@googlemail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan &lt;barryn@pobox.com&gt;
Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dileep Malepu &lt;dileep.debian@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU: Fix FPDSS on Zen1</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-07T09:40:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e6af5286efe5a56128b34032572c9ce9ebeccda3'/>
<id>e6af5286efe5a56128b34032572c9ce9ebeccda3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e55d98e7756135f32150b9b8f75d580d0d4b2dd3 upstream.

Zen1's hardware divider can leave, under certain circumstances, partial
results from previous operations.  Those results can be leaked by
another, attacker thread.

Fix that with a chicken bit.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e55d98e7756135f32150b9b8f75d580d0d4b2dd3 upstream.

Zen1's hardware divider can leave, under certain circumstances, partial
results from previous operations.  Those results can be leaked by
another, attacker thread.

Fix that with a chicken bit.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiayuan Chen</name>
<email>jiayuan.chen@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-03T01:45:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=474e00b935db250cac320d10c1d3cf4e44b46721'/>
<id>474e00b935db250cac320d10c1d3cf4e44b46721</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0f42e3f4fe2a58394e37241d02d9ca6ab7b7d516 upstream.

SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2
value (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc
bucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use
skb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from
skb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.

However, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact
requested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller
(e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the
requested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then
slab_build_skb() -&gt; ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting
skb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching
SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free
the object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original
kmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:

  kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected
  skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k

Fix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps
the free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification
for KFENCE objects.

Fixes: bf9f1baa279f ("net: add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb-&gt;head")
Reported-by: Antonius &lt;antonius@bluedragonsec.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAK8a0jxC5L5N7hq-DT2_NhUyjBxrPocoiDazzsBk4TGgT1r4-A@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260403014517.142550-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0f42e3f4fe2a58394e37241d02d9ca6ab7b7d516 upstream.

SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2
value (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc
bucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use
skb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from
skb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.

However, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact
requested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller
(e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the
requested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then
slab_build_skb() -&gt; ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting
skb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching
SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free
the object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original
kmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:

  kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected
  skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k

Fix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps
the free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification
for KFENCE objects.

Fixes: bf9f1baa279f ("net: add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb-&gt;head")
Reported-by: Antonius &lt;antonius@bluedragonsec.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAK8a0jxC5L5N7hq-DT2_NhUyjBxrPocoiDazzsBk4TGgT1r4-A@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260403014517.142550-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pengpeng Hou</name>
<email>pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T12:12:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=10ebed83f9f6414af4e85bc85ffaeda7effdd874'/>
<id>10ebed83f9f6414af4e85bc85ffaeda7effdd874</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a44ce6aa2efb61fe44f2cfab72bb01544bbca272 upstream.

The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".

That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().

As a result, a case such as

  [ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535

is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.

Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().

Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
  explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
  mapped-v4 example

Fixes: 75b54cb57ca3 ("rxrpc: Add IPv6 support")
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou &lt;pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-22-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a44ce6aa2efb61fe44f2cfab72bb01544bbca272 upstream.

The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".

That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().

As a result, a case such as

  [ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535

is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.

Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().

Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
  explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
  mapped-v4 example

Fixes: 75b54cb57ca3 ("rxrpc: Add IPv6 support")
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou &lt;pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-22-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang Jie</name>
<email>jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T12:12:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=03fd2ef73cb4ffd0af100a95b634af54f474414e'/>
<id>03fd2ef73cb4ffd0af100a95b634af54f474414e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c upstream.

Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang &lt;jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c upstream.

Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang &lt;jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix buffer overread in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator()</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T12:12:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1c4422d8be81718ecb15d79aedff607323085201'/>
<id>1c4422d8be81718ecb15d79aedff607323085201</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f564af387c8c28238f8ebc13314c589d7ba8475d upstream.

Fix rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() to check the buffer size before checking
the nonce.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-20-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f564af387c8c28238f8ebc13314c589d7ba8475d upstream.

Fix rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() to check the buffer size before checking
the nonce.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-20-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix leak of rxgk context in rxgk_verify_response()</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T12:12:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1bd3d01378c1f9ecd313d394b51c808c1f418615'/>
<id>1bd3d01378c1f9ecd313d394b51c808c1f418615</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7e1876caa8363056f58a21d3b31b82c2daf7e608 upstream.

Fix rxgk_verify_response() to clean up the rxgk context it creates.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-19-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7e1876caa8363056f58a21d3b31b82c2daf7e608 upstream.

Fix rxgk_verify_response() to clean up the rxgk context it creates.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-19-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix integer overflow in rxgk_verify_response()</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T12:12:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1e242beb6b1efc3c286f617e8d940c8fbf2ed41'/>
<id>c1e242beb6b1efc3c286f617e8d940c8fbf2ed41</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 699e52180f4231c257821c037ed5c99d5eb0edb8 upstream.

In rxgk_verify_response(), there's a potential integer overflow due to
rounding up token_len before checking it, thereby allowing the length check to
be bypassed.

Fix this by checking the unrounded value against len too (len is limited as
the response must fit in a single UDP packet).

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-18-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 699e52180f4231c257821c037ed5c99d5eb0edb8 upstream.

In rxgk_verify_response(), there's a potential integer overflow due to
rounding up token_len before checking it, thereby allowing the length check to
be bypassed.

Fix this by checking the unrounded value against len too (len is limited as
the response must fit in a single UDP packet).

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-18-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:46:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T12:12:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5cdf57eda01a1ffaeb61ac39ec4dcc94a690431e'/>
<id>5cdf57eda01a1ffaeb61ac39ec4dcc94a690431e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f93af41b9f5f798823d0d0fb8765c2a936d76270 upstream.

Add error checking for failure of crypto_skcipher_en/decrypt() to various
rxkad function as the crypto functions can fail with ENOMEM at least.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-17-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f93af41b9f5f798823d0d0fb8765c2a936d76270 upstream.

Add error checking for failure of crypto_skcipher_en/decrypt() to various
rxkad function as the crypto functions can fail with ENOMEM at least.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-17-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
